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      Hardware has become a popular target for attackers to hack into any computing 
and communication system. Starting from the legendary power analysis attacks 
discovered 20 years ago to the recent Intel Spectre and Meltdown attacks, security 
vulnerabilities in hardware design have been exploited for malicious purposes. With 
the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications, where the IoT devices are 
extremely resource constrained, many proven secure but computational expensive 
cryptography protocols cannot be applied on such devices. Thus there is an urgent 
need to understand the hardware vulnerabilities and develop cost effective mitigation 
methods.  
      One established field in the semiconductor and integrated circuit (IC) industry, 
known as IC test, has the goal of ensuring that fabricated ICs are free of 
manufacturing defects and perform the required functionalities. Testing is essential to 
isolate faulty chips from good ones. The concept of design for test (DFT) has been 
  
integrated in the commercial IC design and fabrication process for several decades. 
Scan chain, which provides test engineer access to all the flip flops in the chip 
through the scan in (SI) and scan out (SO) ports, is the backbone of industrial testing 
methods and can be found in almost all the modern designs. In addition to IC testing, 
scan chain has found applications in intellectual property (IP) protection and IC 
identification. However, attackers can also leverage the controllability and 
observability of scan chain as a side channel to break systems such as cryptographic 
chips. This dissertation addresses these two important security problems by proposing 
(1) a practical scan chain based security primitive for IP protection and (2) a partial 
scan chain framework that can mitigate all the existing scan based attacks.  
      First, we observe the fact that each D-flip-flop has two output ports, Q and Q’, 
designed to simplify the logic and has been used to reduce the power consumption for 
IC test. The availability of both Q and Q’ ports provide the opportunity for IP 
protection. More specifically, we can generate a digital fingerprint by selecting 
different connection styles between adjacent scan cells during the design of scan 
chain. This method has two major advantages: fingerprints are created as a post-
silicon procedure and therefore there will be little fabrication overhead; altering the 
connection style requires the modification of test vectors for each fingerprinted IP and 
thus enables a non-intrusive fingerprint verification method. This addresses the 
overhead and detectability problems, two of the most challenging problems of 
designing practical IP fingerprinting techniques in the past two decades. Combined 
with the recently developed reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs) that are popular for 
embedded and IoT devices, we design an IC identification (ID) scheme utilizing the 
  
different connection styles. We perform experiments on standard benchmarks to 
demonstrate that our approach has low design overhead. We also conduct security 
analysis to show that such fingerprints and IC IDs are robust against various attacks. 
      In the second part of this dissertation, we consider the scan chain side channel 
attack, which has been reported as one of the most severe side channel attacks to 
modern secure systems. We argue that the current countermeasures are restricted to 
the requirement of providing direct SI and SO for testing and thus suffers the 
vulnerability of leaving this side channel open to the attackers as well. Therefore, we 
propose a novel public-private partial scan chain based approach with the basic idea 
of removing the flip flops that store sensitive information from the scan chain. This 
will eliminate the scan chain side channel, but it also limits IC test. The key 
contribution in our proposed public-private partial scan chain design is that it can 
keep the full test coverage while providing security to the scan chain. This is achieved 
by chaining the removed flip flops into one or more private partial scan chains and 
adding protections to the SI and SO ports of such chains. Unlike the traditional partial 
scan design which not only fails to provide full fault coverage, but also incur huge 
overhead in test time and test vector generation time, we propose a set of techniques 
to ensure that the desired test vectors can be entered into the system efficiently. These 
techniques include test vector reordering, test vector reusing, and test vector 
generation based on a novel finite state machine (FSM) structure we have invented. 
On the other hand, to enable the test engineers the ability to observe the test output to 
diagnose the chip while not leaking information to the attackers, we propose two 
lightweight mechanisms, one based on linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and the 
  
other one based on configurable physical unclonable function (PUF). Finally, we 
discuss a protocol on how in-field test can be realized using our public-private partial 
scan chain. We conduct experiments with industrial scan design tools to demonstrate 
that the required hardware in our approach has negligible area overhead and gives full 
test coverage with reduced test time and does not need to re-generate test vectors.  
       In sum, this dissertation focuses on the role of scan chain, a conventional design 
for test facility, in hardware security. We show that scan chain features can be 
leveraged to create practical IP protection techniques including IP watermarking and 
fingerprinting as well as IC identification and authentication. We also propose a novel 
public-private partial scan design principle to close the scan chain side channel to the 
attackers. Through this dissertation work, we demonstrate that it is possible to 
develop highly practical scan chain based techniques that can benefit both the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
      Besides delivering the correct functionality, the objectives of integrated circuit 
(IC) design have evolved from area and delay minimization to the optimization of 
testability, power consumption, and manufacturability. In the past 20 years, various 
IC security concerns have gained a lot of attention. In this dissertation, we study the 
role of scan chain, a traditional design for testing (DFT) technology, in hardware 
security. More specifically, we focus on two challenging problems: (1) developing 
practical scan chain based intellectual property (IP) protection techniques and (2) 
designing scan chains that are secure against side channel attacks. 
      In this chapter, we first introduce scan chain as a popular DFT technique in 
section 1.1. Then we discuss IP protection and give the rationale that scan chain can 
help to build robust and practical IP protection solutions in section 1.2. After that, we 
give a brief overview of the security vulnerabilities in scan chains and why it is hard 
to prevent scan chain side channel attacks in section 1.3. We present the key ideas 
and main contributions of this dissertation in section 1.4. The structure of this 
dissertation is given in section 1.5 to conclude this chapter.  
1.1 Design for Testing Technique 
      Driven by the huge demands from the emerging applications and market, the 
semiconductor industry races to pack as many hardware as possible into their 
products, causing the very large scale integration (VLSI) of IC design to move 
quickly from thousands of logic gates in the late 1970’s to nowadays billions of logic 




design. Meanwhile, competitors do everything possible to improve product 
performance and shorten the time-to-market. More importantly, as ICs have evolved 
from simple computational devices to the pervasive things in our daily life in the 
forms of cloud servers, industrial control systems, routers, autonomous vehicles, 
smart phones, implantable medical devices, smart home appliances as well as various 
devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) applications, they play a much more critical 
role in our quality of life and could be life threatening in many scenarios. Therefore, 
it was identified in the 1980s about the need of chip testing to ensure that the 
fabricated ICs are free of manufacturing defects and perform the required 
functionalities before they can be delivered to customers [1].  
      However, this turned out to be an extremely hard problem that often requires 
solving many NP-complete problems such as the Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) 
problem. It is known that the manufacturing process cannot be 100% error free. The 
defects in silicon could contribute towards the errors introduced in the physical device. 
Although formal verification can ensure the correct functionality, it may fail to detect 
manufacturing variation caused defects which are becoming more and more popular 
with the technology scaling to the end of Moore’s Law [2]. Running all the functional 
tests on each copy of the manufactured devices to guarantee correct functionalities is 
extremely time-consuming and unrealistic because of the number of transistors on the 
device (could be in billions), the number of copies of the devices (might be in 
millions), and small amount of time and budget for testing. The concept of DFT was 
proposed as a practical solution where a number of test and debug features is added in 




turned into an essential feature of the System-on-a-Chip (SoC) design methodology 
today. 
      Simply stated, DFT is some extra logic circuitry that the IC designers put in the 
design to facilitate the design to be testable after production, named production tests. 
By making possible that the production tests can be applied at the end of the VLSI 
manufacturing process, test engineers can validate that each fabricated chip is free of 
manufacturing defects. From this perspective, DFT is a detection technique to tell 
whether a physical device is faulty or not. Since it only detects production faults and 
is not designed to correct the faults, if a chip is found faulty, it will be discarded and 
never be shipped to customers. Since every single device must be tested after 
production, how to minimize the test cost, in terms of the time and power 
consumption required for the test, becomes a prominent issue. In addition, a practical 
testing method should have a very high probability of detecting faults on the chips to 
avoid possible catastrophic consequences of inadequate testing. 
      Scan chain is one of the most successful DFT techniques and can be found in 
almost all the modern designs. The insertion of scan chain, which involves adding 
extra logic and signals dedicated for testing, occurs after a design is verified to be 
functionally correct. A scan cell, which is the building block of the scan structure, 
consists of a conventional D flip-flop and a 2-to-1 multiplexer connected to the D 
input port of the D flip-flop. All the scan cells are then connected in the form of a 
chain, known as scan chain. Recall that system’s internal states are stored in the 
memory or register, where the basic storage unit is a flip-flop that stores one single bit 




flop through a dedicated scan in (SI) port. It also allows the test engineers to observe 
the content of each flip-flop through a scan out (SO) port. In this way, test engineers 
are provided with the full controllability and observability of the circuit’s internal 
states. Thus under the test mode, all the sequential elements are controllable by the 
external test pins, basically turning the sequential circuit into a combinational design. 
This solves the challenging problem confronting test engineers for a long time by 
avoiding sequential Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG), which is much more 
complex than the combinational ATPG due to the unknown starting state and 
extremely long test sequences. By inserting scan chain in the design, only 
combinational ATPG is required to generate test patterns, which has greatly improved 
test efficiency and test reliability.  
      There have been many variations of scan chains. In this dissertation, we will focus 
on the following three types of scan chains: partial scan chain, multiple scan chains 
and reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs). Partial scan chain was proposed a couple 
of decades ago to minimize the area overhead and scan sequence length which will 
reduce both test time and test power. In a partial scan chain, only a subset of flip-flops 
will be scanned instead of all the flip-flops in the tradition scan chain. Multiple scan 
chains are applied to reduce test application time, but it requires efficient compression 
and decompression techniques to reduce test data volume. It partitions a single scan 
chain into several chains. RSNs, as its name suggests, allow the scan structure to be 
configured to reduce access time of scan structures since irrelevant segments will be 
bypassed during test. A detailed description of these scan structures will be presented 




      A few other well-known structured DFT techniques have been adopted in the 
industry for decades as well. Built-in self-test (BIST) allows the circuit to perform 
self-testing by adding an on-chip pattern generator to generate test patterns which are 
fed into the scan chain, and an on-chip result compressor to compress the scanned out 
responses of all patterns into a final signature, which is then compared with the 
expected signature to determine the correctness of a circuit. This technique lowers the 
test cost since there is no need to supply most of the test patterns from an external 
tester, thus reducing required test pins. Meanwhile, it can enable high speed tests that 
allow testing at the speed of actual operation. However, the fault coverage achieved 
by BIST does not meet test requirements in some cases. It does not scale well as the 
size of the circuit increases.  
      Boundary scan, also known as Joint Test Access Group (JTAG), provides test 
access to components embedded in a system. It was originally developed in the mid-
1980s to address the increasing difficulty of testing printed circuit boards (PCBs). 
After its introduction as an industry standard in 1990, JTAG has been in widespread 
use. The original motivation for JTAG was boundary scan testing, a method for 
gaining direct control of the I/O pins at the boundary of a chip during test. This 
enables efficient testing of the interconnections between devices that are mounted on 
a circuit board. Today, everything from testing interconnects and functionality on ICs 
to programming flash memory of systems deployed in the field and everything in-
between can be accomplished through JTAG. In that sense, JTAG has become a 
common hardware interface that provides external environments with a way to 




testing. It offers two significant advantages. First, its serial interface requires only a 
minimum set of test access pins. Second, it facilitates design re-use and standard 
protocols since it is an IEEE standard. 
      At the heart of a JTAG network is a Test Access Port (TAP) controller, the most 
common block used in support of on-chip testing.  In essence, it is a state machine 
that controls the behavior of the JTAG network. The state machine can be divided 
into three sections. One section consists of the reset state and the run test state. The 
two remaining sections are essentially duplicates, except that one pertains to the data 
register and the other pertains to the instruction register. A JTAG network typically 
has four standard pins plus one optional pin. The Test Clock pin dictates the speed of 
the TAP controller. The Test Mode Select pin controls what action JTAG takes, that 
is the transitions in the FSM of the TAP controller. The Test Data Input pin feeds data 
into the chip and the Test Data Output pin reads data out of the chip. The fifth 
optional pin, Test Reset, is used to reset JTAG to a known good state. There are two 
types of registers associated with boundary scan. Each compliant device has one 
instruction register, holding the current instruction used by the TAP controller, which 
then decides what to do with the received signals. Two or more data registers may 
also be included. 
      In sum, DFT techniques provide an elegant solution to the challenging problem of 
IC testing. With the invention of various DFT techniques, in particularly the scan 
chain design, the test efforts are notably reduced to satisfy the complex test needs. 




which is another important challenge for today’s IC design. The following two 
sections provide the motivation of our work. 
1.2 Intellectual Property Protection 
      Intellectual property (IP) refers to a category of properties that includes intangible 
creations of the human intellect, and primarily encompasses copyrights, patents, and 
trademarks. In this dissertation, we will discuss IPs in the semiconductor industry, 
where the IPs have a very similar concept as the traditional ones but require quite 
different protection schemes. In electronic design, an IP core or IP block is a reusable 
unit of logic, cell or integrated circuit that belongs to some designer or company. IP 
cores fall into three categories: hard IPs, firm IPs and soft IPs.  
 Hard IP cores refer to designs that are delivered to the customer in the 
unchangeable forms such as a plug-and-play component, a memory system, or a 
final silicon layout. These cores are carefully designed and fine-engineered to 
provide the best possible performance in terms of area, delay, and/or power 
consumption. They cannot be customized for different process technologies, 
making them not portable among different manufacturers. Thus hard cores are 
the most restrictive form for IP core delivery.  
 Firm IP cores are also known as semi-hard IP cores. They are a form of gate-
level netlist where the users of the cores have the flexibility to place the module 
as per usage. For this purpose, firm IPs normally provide some level of user-
programmable configurations. In firm cores, modifications are allowed to some 




The performance of firm IPs is not as good as the hard IPs, but is normally 
predictable to help designers make the decision of whether to reuse them. 
 Soft IP cores are designs that can be integrated into large designs and re-
synthesized. The most popular soft IPs are synthesizable register transfer level 
(RTL) codes. They are flexible and can be modified at ease to fit into the large 
design that they will be a part of. Soft IPs do not depend on any specific 
technology and have the best portability. However, their performance is 
unpredictable as it depends on many factors from the technology library being 
used to the experience of the designers. 
      As the size and complexity involved in designing ICs are continuously outpacing 
the designer’s ability to use the available silicon in a meaningful manner, known as 
the productivity gap, IP reuse based design methodology was introduced in the early 
1990’s [3]. It effectively shortened time-to-market windows and reduced design cost. 
That being said, IP reuse based system design was quickly adopted as an industrial 
standard, where designs are shared among multiple parties in the forms of 
hard/firm/soft IPs. Because of the lucrative incentive of IP reuse and the sharing 
nature of it, this reuse based design methodology is vulnerable to various IP 
infringements such as IP theft and misuse. Indeed, IP protection was identified as one 
of the original challenges for design reuse to thrive [4]. Apparently, legal methods 
such as copyright, patent, and trade secrets are needed, but they are not sufficient due 
to the lack of technical methods to identify and trace IPs in order to protect the rights 




fingerprinting, and IC metering was proposed between 1998 and 2001 with most of 
the early efforts included in a monograph published in 2003 [5]. 
      IP watermarking was first reported in 1998 [6-8]. Its concept is similar to 
watermarking multimedia artifacts, where secret information is embedded in the 
content as the proof of ownership of the artifacts. Practical watermarking techniques 
must be robust and resilient against potential attacks, be readily detected to prove 
authorship with high confidence, incur no or minimal negative impacts on the quality 
and performance of the artifact, and take reasonable efforts to embed and detect the 
watermark. In addition, IP watermarking must fully preserve IP’s functionality, which 
makes it much more challenging. Over the years, watermarking methods have been 
applied to protect IPs in different forms, such as Verilog codes [9], combinational 
logic [6, 10], sequential circuits [11], finite state machines (FSM) [12], field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) designs [13], physical designs [7] as well as 
computer-aided design (CAD) tools [14]. A survey can be found in [15].  
      Although watermarking can establish authorship when IP piracy such as illegal 
redistribution occurs, it offers little help in tracking down the guilty buyer who should 
be responsible for the illegal act. To overcome this problem, the concept of IP 
fingerprinting was introduced in 1999 [16, 17]. IP fingerprinting embeds each buyer’s 
signature along with the designer’s watermark in the IP such that each IP is unique. 
This attribute enables IP providers to trace individual buyers, which can help identify 
guilty buyers and thus protect legal buyers in case IP piracy occurs. In short, one can 
view fingerprints as customized watermarks. A practical fingerprinting method 




resilient against various attacks that do not apply to watermarking methods, 
particularly the collusion attack where an attacker obtains multiple copies of the same 
IP with different fingerprints and compares them to reveal fingerprint locations and 
then removes or forges fingerprints. Furthermore, since the fingerprint will make each 
copy of the IP distinct, one problem that remained unsolved for almost two decades is 
how to design practical, mainly in terms of cost, IP fingerprinting methods. In this 
dissertation, we address this challenge by proposing a scan chain based practical IP 
fingerprinting scheme. 
      IC metering is a protocol that enables the IC designer to trace and control each 
copy of the fabricated ICs that contains the protected IPs to prevent a dishonest 
foundry from overbuilding chips [18]. This normally requires a non-alterable 
identification. The cost-effective serial number technique is perhaps the most popular 
and one of the earliest ways for IC identification.  
      A serial number can be physically indented on the device or stored permanently in 
the memory. Unfortunately, the fact that it can also be easily removed or forged 
makes it unsuitable to countermeasure IP theft such as illegal reproduction, 
redistribution, and foundry overbuilding. Several intrinsic unclonable IC tagging 
schemes based on silicon manufacturing variations have been proposed. The ICID tag 
technique was first proposed in 2007 [19]. In this technique, a sequence of control 
signals selects an array of transistors to drive a capacitive load. The output voltage 
differs for each chip due to inherent IC manufacturing process variations. Because 
such variations are random and uncontrollable, an ICID is considered an unclonable 




challenge response pairs created by the physical unclonable functions (PUF) [20] 
have also been used for IC identification. The emerging PUF uses the unclonable 
intrinsic fabrication variations in delay, capacitance, threshold voltage, and other 
sources to produce a unique response to a given challenge to authenticate a device. 
These can be used for IC identification, but they cannot detect IP theft because 
illegally copied or over-built ICs will have different variations and hence different 
identifications from the original copy. 
      In this dissertation, we extend the existing scan chain based IP watermarking to IP 
fingerprinting and IC authentication. There are two different styles to connect one 
flip-flop to another during the scan chain design. It has been utilized to minimize test 
power consumption [21] and more recently to design IP watermark by deliberate 
selection of such connection styles [22]. We observe that this can be conveniently 
used to create IP fingerprint and IDs with two advantages. First, we propose to do this 
after chips are fabricated and thus make it affordable. Second, scan chain’s 
controllability and observability features provide a non-intrusive way to verify such 
fingerprints or IDs. We will elaborate this in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
1.3 Security Vulnerabilities of Scan Chain 
      Nowadays, the Internet provides the essential communication to connect literally 
billions of people through various devices that are powered by one or multiple ICs. 
The need for secure storage and transferring of information has become indispensable 
under the escalating attacks. One ancient art that is still widely used today is 
cryptography [23], which is most closely associated with the development and 




encryption/decryption algorithms are traditionally implemented in software for 
portability and flexibility, but the performance of software implementation is a 
notable problem. Hence, hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms are 
widely deployed as an alternative solution due to its efficiency in run-time and power 
consumption. This becomes more and more evident with the development of IoT 
applications where resources are extremely constrained.  
      When we look at the shift of attacking in the past half century, we see that the 
attackers started with the attempts to break the cryptographic algorithms, with which 
they have enjoyed some early success. But such vulnerabilities normally are quickly 
fixed and today’s cryptography is built on solid mathematical foundations and no one 
tries to break a secure system from its cryptography underpinning. Then the attacking 
efforts shifted to the vulnerabilities in the software implementation of these 
cryptographic algorithms and the networking protocols, which are not designed with 
security in mind. After several decades of battles between the attackers and the 
defenders, standards to build secure software and network to support the 
cryptographic algorithms were established.  Next, the attackers put their eyes on the 
hardware implementations, where designer’s top goal has always been performance. 
Therefore, we have seen many physical attacks in the past couple of decades. Among 
them, side channel attacks have been extensively studied to crack a large amount of 
supposedly secure systems. This type of attack takes advantages of the information 
leakage from the hardware, including timing [24], power [25], electromagnetic 
radiation [26], error message [27], etc., to obtain the secret data that have been 




      As we have mentioned earlier, test engineers can shift in test patterns through the 
dedicated SI port and shift out test responses through the SO port. For example, by 
switching between normal execution mode and test mode, attackers can access the 
intermediate states during encryption which can help them retrieve the cipher keys. 
Successful attacks based on scan chain have been reported on many cryptographic 
chips, including DES [28, 29], AES [30], ECC [31], and RSA [32]. In the test-mode-
only attacks, by exploiting scan chain’s controllability and observability, it is also 
possible to break the system through a scan chain. In [33, 34], the authors explore the 
vulnerability of letting the system enter the unspecified or undesirable states, which 
they achieved through the insecure system implementation. When a scan chain is 
available, this becomes trivial due to the controllability of a scan chain.  
      We will elaborate these attacks and their countermeasures as well as other related 
work in a later chapter. Here we just mention that the countermeasures are mainly 
based on either controlling the switch between normal mode and test mode, or 
obfuscating the scan output values to confuse the attackers. We believe that securing 
a scan chain is a very hard problem because one cannot distinguish test engineers and 
scan chain attackers, who have the same goal to understand the internal states of the 
system through the controllability and observability provided by the scan chain. 
Controlling the switch between normal mode and test mode or obfuscating the scan 
output make it harder for the attackers to launch scan chain side chain attacks, but 
they also make IC test inconvenient. In this dissertation, we propose a novel approach 
based on the public-private partial scan chain design to provide both security and test 




control their SI and SO to avoid information leak to the attackers. We will establish 
the foundation of this approach in Chapter 5 and elaborate how we can secure the SI 
and SO ports in the private scan chains in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, respectively.  
1.4 Key Contributions 
      This dissertation addresses two important security problems related to scan chain 
by proposing (1) a practical scan chain based security primitive for IP protection and 
(2) a partial scan chain framework that can mitigate all the existing scan based 
attacks.  
      First, we observe the fact that each D-flip-flop has two output ports, Q and Q’, 
designed to simplify the logic and has been used to reduce the power consumption for 
IC test. The availability of both Q and Q’ ports provide the opportunity for IP 
protection. More specifically, we can generate digital fingerprint by selecting 
different connection styles between adjacent scan cells during the design of scan 
chain. This method has two major advantages: fingerprints are created as a post-
silicon procedure and therefore there will be little fabrication overhead; altering the 
Q-SD or Q'-SD connection style requires the modification of test vectors for each 
fingerprinted IP and thus enables a non-intrusive fingerprint verification method. This 
addresses the overhead and detectability problems, two of the most challenging 
problems of designing practical IP fingerprinting techniques in the past two decades. 
Combined with the recently developed reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs) that are 
popular for embedded and IoT devices, we design an IC identification scheme 
utilizing the Q-SD and Q’-SD connection styles. We perform experiments on 




also conduct security analysis to show that such fingerprints and IC IDs are robust 
against various attacks. Another ongoing work along this line is to develop a device 
authentication protocol based on RSNs.  
      In the second part of this dissertation, we consider the scan chain side channel 
attacks, which have been reported as one of the most severe side channel attacks to 
modern secure systems. We argue that the current countermeasures are restricted to 
the requirement of providing direct SI and SO for testing and thus suffer the 
vulnerability of leaving this side channel open to the attackers as well. Therefore, we 
propose a novel public-private partial scan chain based approach with the basic idea 
of removing the flip-flops that store sensitive information from the scan chain. This 
will eliminate the scan chain side channel, but it also limits IC test. The key 
contribution in our proposed public-private partial scan chain design is that it can 
keep the full test coverage while providing security to the scan chain. This is achieved 
by chaining the removed flip-flops into one or more private partial scan chains and 
adding protections to the SI and SO ports of such chains. Unlike the traditional partial 
scan design which not only fails to provide full fault coverage, but also incur huge 
overhead in test time and test vector generation time, we propose a set of techniques 
to ensure that the desired test vectors can be entered into the systems efficiently. 
These techniques include test vector reordering, test vector reusing, and test vector 
generation based on a novel finite state machine (FSM) structure we have invented. 
On the other hand, to enable the test engineers the ability to observe the test output to 
diagnose the chip while not leaking information to the attackers, we propose two 




other one based on configurable physical unclonable function (PUF). Finally, we 
discuss a protocol on how in-field test can be realized using our public-private partial 
scan chain. We conduct experiments with industrial scan design tools to demonstrate 
that the required hardware in our approach has negligible area overhead and gives full 
test coverage with reduced test time and does not need to re-generate test vectors.  
       In sum, this dissertation focuses on the role of scan chain, a conventional design 
for testing facility, in hardware security. We show that scan chain features can be 
leveraged to create practical IP protection techniques including IP watermarking and 
fingerprinting as well as IC identification and authentication. We also propose a novel 
public-private partial scan design principle to close the scan chain side channel to the 
attackers. Through this dissertation work, we demonstrate that it is possible to 
develop highly practical scan chain based techniques that can benefit both the 
community of IC test and hardware security. Here is the list of our key contributions: 
(1) The scan chain based fingerprint we proposed in this dissertation is by far the 
most cost-effective post-silicon digital fingerprinting approach, which has high 
practical value.   
(2) The scan chain based fingerprint we proposed provides two levels of detection 
mechanisms to verify the embedded fingerprint. The non-destructive method is 
the most convenient yet secure among all the known approaches. 
(3) The RSN based device identification and authentication protocol are both the first 
of their kind. The fact that they are compatible with industry standards makes 




(4) The public-private partial scan chain design is a breakthrough in secure scan 
chain design. The separation of public partial scan chain and private partial scan 
chains ideally can completely prevent information leakage to the attackers and 
thus making scan chain side channel attacks impossible. We have also provided a 
set of techniques that can provide provable full test coverage with the minimal 
cost. The FSM based approach to set values in the flip-flops in the private partial 
scan chains is novel. It combines both scalability and security, which allows it to 
be applied to real life designs and does not bring new vulnerabilities to the scan 
chain design, respectively. 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
      In Chapter 2, we provide the necessary background of scan chain. After 
introducing the basic concepts of scan chain, we focus on the following three features 
of scan chain that are directly relevant to this dissertation: the Q-SD and Q’-SD 
connection styles, partial scan chains, and the reconfigurable scan networks (RSN). 
      In Chapter 3, we present our scan chain based IP fingerprinting technique that 
utilizes the Q-SD and Q’-SD connection styles. We will elaborate the following 
problems: where to insert the digital fingerprint, how to detect the embedded 
fingerprint, and the security analysis of the approach against possible attacks. 
Simulations results on the design overhead incurred by embedding such fingerprint 
will also be reported.  
      In Chapter 4, we propose an RSN based IC identification scheme for embedded 




following the industrial design standards. Using public benchmark circuits, we 
demonstrate that this approach can accommodate a large amount of distinct IDs.  
      In Chapter 5, we lay out the framework of our public-private partial scan chain 
design to prevent scan chain side channel attacks. We give a detailed motivation and 
rationale of our approach. We point out the key challenges in this approach, namely 
how to generate input test vectors, how to securely verify output test vectors, and how 
to provide the in-field test capability.  
      In Chapter 6, we address the challenge of generating input test vectors. We 
propose a hidden-test-vector graph and develop a set of test vector reordering and 
reusing, as well as an FSM based approach to ensure that our method will be able to 
test all the original test vectors with no need to regenerate any test vectors, and thus 
provide the full test coverage. 
      In Chapter 7, we report two approaches to obfuscate the output test vector in order 
to provide security to the private partial scan chains. One approach uses LFSR and 
the other uses configurable PUF. We also propose an in-field test protocol that 
enables test engineers to apply a new input test vector to the public-private partial 
scan chains and to observe the output test vector to detect whether there is any error.  
      Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a revisit of scan chain’s role in 




Chapter 2: Preliminary on Scan Chain 
2.1 Full Scan Chain 
      To improve testability of sequential circuits, scan chain, as a cost-effective 
technique, has been one of the most popular testing methods. The motivation of scan 
chain insertion is to convert sequential elements, which are flip-flops in this case, into 
accessible units, such that the internal states of the design can be easily controlled and 
observed via external pins. In a full scan design, all the flip-flops are included in the 
scan chain, making the CUT fully combinational. This makes ATPG particularly 
simple as no sequential test pattern generation is required. Using the much simpler 
combinational ATPG would be sufficient to obtain tests for all testable faults in the 
combinational logic. In addition, it is worth noting that only clocked D flip-flops can 
be used as state variables in the designs with scan chains.  
      In the IC design and fabrication process, the insertion of scan chain occurs after 
the design is verified to be functionally correct. The scan insertion procedure involves 
adding extra logic and signals dedicated for testing. Each conventional D flip-flop 
(Figure 1(a)) is replaced by a scan flip-flop, also called scan cell (Figure 2(a)), which 
introduces two extra input signals, scan mode input SD and scan enable SE, as well as 
one extra output signal, scan mode output Q2. These scan cells are then connected in 
the form of a shift register, known as scan chain (Figure 2(b)), by connecting the scan 
mode output port Q2 of one scan cell to the scan mode input SD of another scan cell. 
The SE signal is used to switch operating modes between normal mode and test 




      Figure 1(a) is a traditional D flip-flop controlled by the clock signal CLK. 1-bit 
information D will be stored for a clock cycle and can be accessed through the Q and 
Q’ output ports. The value of D is then overwritten by the data input at the next clock 
signal. The characteristic equation of a D flip-flop is written as Qnext = D, Q’next = D’. 
      Figure 1(b) is a conceptual circuit with 7 D flip-flops and the circuit under test 
(CUT) consists of only combinational logic gates. The CUT takes “Primary Input” 
and the contents of the 7 D flip-flops as input and produce a “Primary Output” as well 
as a new value for each of the D flip-flops. This implies that even with the same 
primary input value, the CUT may generate different primary output if the D flip-
flops have different contents, which makes circuit test a very challenging problem 
since there is no input port to directly set the value for each flip-flop. A set of such 
values is called an input test vector and modern chips have thousands of flip-flops and 
require tens of thousands test vectors to ensure that the chip functions without defect 
and failure.   
 
 
(a) A D flip-flop.                    (b) A circuit with 7 D flip-flops. 
 




   Scan chain is then inserted during the design time to tackle this issue. Figure 2 (a) 
shows a scan cell built on top of the D flip-flop. Instead of getting value from data 
input directly, the D flip-flop will take the value from a multiplexer (MUX) that is 
controlled by the SE signal. When SE = 0, the MUX outputs the “Data” value and the 
scan cell behaves the same way as a D flip-flop. However, when SE = 1, the MUX 
outputs the value from the scan input (SI) port which, provides great controllability 
and observability to IC test engineers.  This relationship can be described as D = SE’ ⋅ 
Data + SE ⋅ SI. 
      Therefore, a scan-based design can operate in two modes, governed by the SE 
signal. When this signal is disabled, scan cells are connected to the circuit to behave 
as functionally expected, which is referred to as functional mode. With the signal 
enabled, the design switches to test mode when scan cells structurally form a shift 
register. Figure 2 (b) depicts the concept of scan chain. Note that each D flip-flop 
 
 
(a) A single scan cell.                     (b) The circuit after scan chain is built. 
 
Figure 2: A single scan cell based on the traditional D flip-flop is displayed in (a). 
The circuit from Figure 1(b) after the scan chain is built is shown in (b). SI = scan 




inside the scan cell still keeps its connection with the CUT. However, all the scan 
cells are connected together as a chain. The scan mode output Q2 of each scan cell 
(except the last one) acts as the SI for the next scan cell. This change significantly 
improves testability by facilitating a cost-effective way to insert the desired input test 
vector to the flip-flops and to shift out for comparison. We elaborate this with the 
following example: suppose we want to test that when the input test vector is 
1011000 for the 7 flip-flops from left to right, after the CUT executes with certain 
given primary input, whether the system reaches a state where the 7 flip-flops have 
1110101 as their contents (known as output test vector).  For the design without scan 
chain in Figure 1 (b), it is extremely hard to set the system at the state 1011000 and 
also challenging to verify that the system moves to state 1110101. However, this test 
becomes trivial with the help of scan chain. We first enable the SE signal SE = 1 and 
input 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1 one by one from the SI port in 7 consecutive clock cycles. The 
first 0 will be shifted 7 times to the rightmost flip-flop D7, the second 0 will be shifted 
6 times to flip-flop D6, and so on. As a result, the 7 flip-flops will be set to 1, 0, 1, 1, 
0, 0, and 0, respectively, exactly the input test vector that is required. Then we set SE 
= 0 to switch the design back to normal mode and execute CUT. To verify the system 
state, we simply shift out the contents of the 7 scan cells through SO port and check 
whether they are 1110101 as expected. It is worth mentioning that the next input test 
vector can be simultaneously placed into the scan cells via SI port while we observe 
their current contents through SO port. 
      In summary, scan testing involves three stages.  First, an input test vector is 




circuit in the test mode (SE = 1). Then the circuit is switched to the functional mode 
(SE = 0) so the CUT can run one or multiple clock cycles starting from the given 
system state with an input from the primary input port. The output can be observed 
from the primary output and system’s updated state will be stored in the scan cells. 
Finally, the circuit will be switched back to the test mode (SE = 1) to allow the 
updated system state information to be shifted from the scan cells to the SO port. One 
can compare this information with the given fault-free response to check whether 
there is any defect or fault. The input vectors and their corresponding fault-free 
responses are referred to as test vectors.  
      In fact, the connection style between adjacent scan cells is not restricted to Q-SD.  
Q’-SD connection style has been applied in the scan design to optimize test power 
consumption as well [45]. As shown in Figure 3(b), instead of connecting all the scan 




(a)                                                                  (b)  
Figure 3: A single scan cell that output port Q’ is used to connect the next scan cell is 
displayed in (a). The circuit of which the connection styles between (D2, D3) and (D5, 




be used for connection, where the second and fifth connection styles have been 
changed to Q’-SD. Recall that for D flip-flop, Q’next = D’. Therefore, any bit of the 
test vectors going through a Q’-SD connection will be flipped. To test the CUT in 
Figure 3(b) with correct states, we need to adjust test vectors according to the 
positions of Q’-SD connection styles in the scan chain. Using the same example for 
Figure 2(b) where the scan chain has only Q-SD connection styles, to test the CUT 
with state 1011000, we need to adjust the input test vector to 1000100 to correctly set 
1011000 in these 7 flip-flops. As the first two bits “10” in the original test vector 
don’t go through any Q’-SD connection in the design of Figure 3(b), they will stay 
the same for the adjusted input test vector. The third to the fifth bits “110” go through 
the Q’-SD connection in the second position and are flipped once, thus need to be 
adjusted to “001”. The last two bits “00” go through both Q’-SD connections in the 
design and are flipped twice, so they don’t need to change.  
2.2 Partial Scan Chain 
      In spite of all the advantages a full scan chain has for testing purpose, it 
introduces hardware area overhead and performance penalties in critical paths. 
Meanwhile, test vectors for full scan chains are lengthy. As an alternative solution, 
partial scan was proposed a few decades ago to provide a trade-off between the ease 
of testing and the cost associated with scan design. In a partial scan chain, only a 
subset of D flip-flops is converted to scan flip-flops and included in the scan path. 
However, it isn’t widely adopted due to the low fault coverage in that the un-scanned 
flip-flops cannot be directly controlled and observed. Thus, sequential ATPG is 




very expensive computational process. It has poor initializability, as well as poor 
controllability/observability of state variables. Cycles in the circuit are believed to be 
mainly responsible for the complexity. The test generation time is normally two 
orders of magnitude higher than that of a full scan chain. The scan test sequences are 
extremely long as well. 
      Figure 4 illustrates the design with a partial scan chain based on the same circuit 
with a full scan chain in Figure 2(b). We can see that two flip-flops, D2 and D5, 
remain as normal D flip-flops. They are not converted to scan cells like others and are 
not chained. As a result, no one can control or observe the contents of these two flip-
flops through the scan chain. The partial scan includes 5 flip-flops, D1, D3, D4, D6, 
and D7 and connects them into a single chain. In particular, scanned flip-flops and un-
scanned flip-flops are controlled from separate clock primary inputs. CLK1 is the 
scan clock, which is only active in the scan mode. CLK2 is the normal clock. Both 





Figure 4: A partial scan chain where the second and fifth flip-flops are removed from 




      Partial scan aims at maximizing the fault coverage while minimizing area and 
performance overhead. This makes how to select flip-flops to scan a prominent issue 
while designing partial scan chains. To approach this problem, previous work can be 
classified into 3 board categories: structural analysis based [76], testability analysis 
based [77] and ATPG based [78]. Structural-analysis based techniques represent the 
sequential circuit as a topology graph such that combinational logic and registers are 
separated into different components of the graph. Then they attempt to remove all 
possible feedback by scanning flip-flops. However, removal of a minimal vertex set is 
an NP-complete problem and moreover, the fault coverage of a sequential ATPG 
cannot be guaranteed even with all cycles (except self-loops) removed. On the other 
hand, the testability analysis based approaches are easier to adopt in terms of 
computational complexity but they usually do not yield good fault coverage for 
circuits with more complex structures. ATPG-based techniques seek to utilize the 
information generated by the test generator to try and detect the aborted faults. This 
type of approaches takes in a list of aborted states that the test generator was unable to 
justify and tries to make those states reachable by selecting the minimal set of flip-
flops. 
2.3 Reconfigurable Scan Networks 
Scan chains are extensively used to reduce the test complexity. They eliminate the 
need for sequential test pattern generation by making internal memory elements 
directly controllable and observable. However, in the traditional design of scan chains, 
where all scan registers are chained into a single scan chain, the time overhead of 




reconfigurable scan networks (RSNs) are introduced, which enable dynamic 
reconfiguration of scan networks and allow cost-efficient access to on-chip 
instrumentations. 
      Figure 5 is an example of an RSN compliant with IEEE1687-2014. Scan data are 
shifted in via the SI port, through a fraction of scan registers, called scan segments, to 
the SO port. The bits a and b of Segment 1 are used to configure the active scan path 
in this case. Meanwhile, Segment 2 and 3 could be an interface to interact with on-chip 
instrumentations. Clearly, the time to access a scan segment in an RSN is proportional 
to the length of the active scan path, which can be significantly reduced by choosing 
access modes such that irrelevant segments are bypassed in the active scan path. For 
example, in Figure 5, given the test pattern for Segment 2, we need to first generate an 
access pattern which set ab = 01 or ab = 10 to ensure that Segment 2 is currently 
included in the active scan path, and then apply the test pattern to Segment 2 to 
facilitate testing. On the other hand, different active scan paths can also be configured 
in this design. Segment 2 can be bypassed if ab = 11. Both Segment 2 and 3 will be 
 
 




bypassed if ab = 00. Thus, RSNs offer high flexibility on the configuration of the scan 
path in order to reduce access time. 
      In the following, we review the definition of reconfigurable scan networks 
presented in [35], which covers the existing RSN standards, IEEE 1149.1-2013 [36] 
and IEEE P1687 (IJTAG). 
      An RSN has four data ports namely scan-input, scan-output, reset input, clock 
input as well as three control ports, capture, shift and update which are controlled by a 
1149.1-compliant TAP [36]. RSNs are composed of scan segments, multiplexers or 
other combinational logic blocks. The scan segment consists of scan registers which 
are accessible through the scan-in and scan-out ports, and an optional shadow register. 
The block diagram of a scan segment is presented in Figure 6. The state of the shadow 
register determines the configuration of scan networks. Scan segments provide access 
to testing structures and enable distributed control over the on-chip instrumentations. 
Each scan segment should support three modes of operations, namely shift, capture 
 
 




and update, which are controlled by external control signals.  
      In the capture mode, the scan registers get overwritten by the data coming from the 
corresponding instrument (Data-in port). During a shift operation, the data from scan-
in port is shifted through the scan registers to scan-out port. In the update mode, the 
data in scan registers is written to the optional shadow register, which determines the 
state of the scan segment. Scan segment might have another control port called select 
which determines whether the scan segment can perform capture, shift and update 
operations. 
      Scan segments are connected either by buffers or Scan Multiplexers. The latter 
selects the path that scan data goes through in the network and its select signal is 
referred to as address in the scan network literature, as shown in Figure 5. The 
internal control signals of scan segments such as select, and the addresses of scan 
multiplexers are determined by the output of combinational logic blocks, whose 
inputs are controlled by the value of shadow registers of scan segments and the 
primary data and control inputs of the RSN. A scan path is active if all the scan 
segments on the path are selected, and the addresses of all on-path scan multiplexers 
are set appropriately. To access a scan segment in the RSN, you need to put this 
segment on an active path. A read or write access to a scan segment, as defined by 
IEEE 1149.1 [36], is a three-step process called a CSU (Capture-Shift-Update) 
operation: in capture mode of a CSU, all the scan registers on the active scan path 
load the test results from their corresponding instrumentation. Then, this data will be 
shifted out during the following shift operation. Note that during shift operation, the 




Finally, in the update mode of a CSU, the contents of scan registers in the active path 
get loaded to the corresponding shadow registers to reconfigure the scan path.  
2.3.1 Segment Insertion Bit Based RSN 
      A segment Insertion Bit (SIB) is a hardware component proposed by IEEE P1687 
[37] which can be used to reconfigure scan networks by bypassing or including scan 
chains in scan paths. It is a simple and flexible architecture that allows hierarchical 
control over the accessibility of individual instruments. A SIB is in principle a 
configurable bypass. As shown in Figure 7, it either bypasses a subordinate 
instrument or sub-network connected to its TO/FORM ports, or connects it to the 
higher level scan chain. The mode of operation is chosen by shifting a single 
configuration bit into the SIBs SI port.  
 
      A possible implementation of the SIB proposed in [38] is presented in Figure 8. 
An SIB has a scan-input and a scan-output as well as four control inputs, capture, 
shift, update and select. It contains a 1-bit shift register S and a 1-bit shadow register 
 
 




U. Note that the same set of external control signals drive scan segments and SIBs in 
a scan network. During the shift operation, based on the value of the shadow register 
U and the select signal, the data from the scan-in port either gets directed to the lower 
level scan segment of the SIB, referred to as Directing mode, or bypasses the lower 
level scan segment and directly goes to the scan-out port, referred to as Bypassing 
mode. The value of the shadow register U only gets updated from S if both update 









Chapter 3: Scan Chain based IP Fingerprinting 
3.1 The Need of IP Fingerprint 
     Fingerprints are the characteristic of an object that is unique and incontrovertible 
so they can be used to identify a particular object from its peers. Fingerprints have 
been used for human identification for ages and also been adopted in multimedia for 
copyright protection of the widely distributed digital data. In the semiconductor and 
integrated circuit (IC) industry, the concept of digital fingerprinting was introduced in 
the late 1990’s with the goal of protecting design intellectual property (IP) from being 
misused [16, 17, 39]. With the promise of giving each copy of the IP, and hence the 
IC that uses the IP, a unique fingerprint, digital fingerprinting has become a hardware 
security primitive and enabling technique for applications such as IP metering, 
identifying IP piracy, detecting IC counterfeiting and overbuilding.  
     These early works demonstrated the feasibility of creating large amount of 
functional identical IPs with distinct implementations [16, 17, 39]. However, the 
proposed techniques are impractical because they create fingerprints in early IP 
design stages, making all the fingerprinted IPs require different masks for fabrication. 
Several practical fingerprint methods have been proposed recently [40, 41], where the 
authors modify the gate level layout of the design based on don’t care conditions to 
add implementation flexibilities and create fingerprints during the post-silicon testing 
phase based on such implementation flexibility. But they suffer from moderate or 
high design overhead (in terms of area and delay), are not easy to be detected, and 




     Meanwhile, IC identification methods based on glitches or path delay variations, 
and the well-studied physical unclonable function (PUF) have also been reported [42, 
43]. They rely on the uncontrollable fabrication variations to identify and authenticate 
ICs. However, when an IC is illegally reproduced or overbuilt, the illegal copies will 
have variations different from the original genuine copy, so they cannot be used for 
the protection of IC and IPs inside. 
     IP owners have to protect themselves as well as legal users from IP theft. Digital 
fingerprinting meets this requirement too. The uniqueness of fingerprint enables the 
trace of each copy of the IP, including those illegally resold IPs. Therefore, the IP 
owner can identify the dishonest user or the victim of the IP thefts. Not only is the 
origin of the design identified, but also the origin of the misappropriation can be 
tracked down. 
3.2 An Illustrative Example  
     In this chapter, we propose a practical and low overhead scan chain based digital 
fingerprinting method that can be primarily used in the following two scenarios: (1) 
conveniently verify and trace the use of IP when the fingerprints are not tampered; 
(2) protect IP and the IC that uses the IP by detecting any attempts to remove or 




      Figure 9 depicts a 5-stage scan chain where the five scan cells (scan flip-flops, or 
SFFs) are labeled as D1 through D5 from left to right. It gives testing engineer the 
ability to put the core under test (CUT) in any desired state (represented as the values 
of the SFFs) by inputting the values, called test vectors, through the scan in (SI) port; 
then observe how the core behaves through the scan out (SO) port. Assume that in 
this case, we have two test vectors X1=00000 and X2=01001. The corresponding 
responses (or next states) are Y1=00000 and Y2=10110. 
      Our fingerprinting approach takes advantage of the fact that scan cells can be 
chained by either the Q-SD or the Q’-SD connection style [45, 46]. Suppose that we 
have identified two pairs of SFFs, (D2, D3) and (D4, D5), as the locations to embed the 
fingerprint. We use the Q-SD connection to embed a bit ‘0’ and the Q’-SD 
connection as a bit ‘1’ (see Figure 9). This will allow us to embed any 2-bit 
fingerprint, “00”, “01”, “10”, or “11”, by selecting different connection styles. 
 
 
Figure 9: An example of a 5-stage scan chain where the connections between (D1, 
D2) and (D3, D4) are selected to embed fingerprints. A 2-bit fingerprint can be 




      Suppose the original design uses the Q-SD connection on both locations, that is, it 
carries the fingerprint “00”. To embed fingerprint “01”, for example, we will connect 
the Q’ port of D4 to the SD port of D5. As a result, when data moves from D4 to D5, 
its value will be flipped. Therefore, we have to change the two test vectors to 
X1=00001 and X2=01000 to ensure that the CUT is tested with states 00000 and 
01001, respectively. Similarly, the output responses Y1 and Y2 will change in a 
similar fashion. Table 1 lists the two test vectors and their corresponding output 
responses for all the four possible fingerprinted designs. 
      To identify each copy of the design, we can simply check the test vector. If the 
test vector or its output response is different from Table 1, then the design is not 
genuine.  
3.4 Scan Chain based Fingerprint: Idea, Advantages and Limitations 
      In our scan chain based fingerprinting method, we first utilize the Q-SD and Q'-
SD connection styles, which are both available and used in scan design, to create 
Table 1: The test vectors and their corresponding output responses for all possible 2-
bit fingerprints 
f1f2 X1 Y1 X2 Y2 
00 01100 01111 00011 10110 
01 01111 10011 00000 01010 
10 00011 11111 01100 00110 






digital fingerprints at the circuit level; then we modify the set of test vectors 
accordingly to keep the fault coverage. Therefore, the fingerprint is embedded both 
inside the scan chain in the form of Q-SD or Q’-SD connections and as the values of 
test vectors. This enables us two ways to detect the fingerprint: a destructive method 
that requires reverse engineering the chip to reveal the connection style of the scan 
chain; and a non-destructive method where the verifier only needs to check the test 
vectors. Compared to the existing fingerprinting methods, our approach has the 
following advantages: 
1. Practical – The fingerprint locations in the scan chain can be selected before 
fabrication and we choose either Q-SD or Q’-SD connection style at post-
silicon stage. So all fingerprinted designs can be fabricated with the same 
mask. The modification to the test vectors does not need any changes on the 
chip. 
2. Ultra-low overhead – Fingerprints are added in the scan chain. This will not 
cause any performance overhead to the core design. We further demonstrate 
that there is little overhead to the scan chain design while maintaining the full 
test coverage.  
3. Non-destructive verification – Fingerprints can be detected and verified from 
the scan input and output without physically opening up the chip.  
      Due to the simplicity and convenience of creating and verifying the fingerprints, it 
might be easy for the attacker to remove, modify, or forge a fingerprint. Hence, the 




attacks, (2) maintain the property of easy fingerprint detection, but (3) not lose fault 
coverage, and (4) not cause significant overhead in testing time and power. Our 
proposed solution is based on the careful selection of fingerprint locations and data 
integrity techniques. It requires both Q-SD and Q’-SD connections to be available, 
which can be implemented with fuses or configurable logic [40, 41], and controllable 
at post-silicon stage, for example, by blowing the fuses or configuring the logic. We 
conduct a comprehensive security analysis which shows that our solution is robust 
unless attackers re-design the scan chain. Experimental results validate that it causes 
little or no overhead in terms of test time and power. 
3.4 Current Digital Fingerprinting Schemes 
      A digital fingerprinting technique embeds unique features, known as fingerprint, 
in each copy of the IP to allow IP owners to trace each copy of the IP. This was first 
reported by Lach et al. in [39], where the authors used an FPGA design partitioning 
and tiling technique to embed distinct fingerprints in the originally watermarked 
design. However, this technique is relatively impractical since the problem must have 
a specific structure. Then Caldwell et al. [16] proposed a generic methodology to 
embed fingerprints in the solutions to optimization problems. The key idea is to apply 
iterative optimization in an incremental fashion to encode distinct fingerprints. Qu 
and Potkonjak [17] introduced a different method based on adding special constraints 
to the design specification such that multiple distinct copies of the design can be 
easily constructed from one seed design. Unfortunately, all these approaches create 
fingerprints in the earlier stage of the VLSI design cycle, inevitably increasing the 




      In [40], a satisfiability don’t-care (SDC) condition based circuit fingerprinting 
technique is developed to create fingerprints at the post-silicon stage by using MUXs 
to replace certain library cells. SDC conditions describe the signal combinations that 
cannot occur, which give rise to the situation that two distinct circuits might have 
exactly the same truth table since the input combination producing different outputs 
does not occur. By locating gates that have SDCs leading into them, referred to as 
fingerprint locations, and finding alternative gates, different fingerprinted copies can 
be generated by using either the original gate or one of its alternatives at each 
fingerprint location. In [41], the authors proposed to utilize observability don’t-care 
(ODC) conditions and add extra wires without changing the design’s functionality. 
An ODC condition occurs when local signal changes cannot be observed at a primary 
output. Thus, two circuits can implement exactly the same function although they are 
physically different. This feature allows them to create a 1-bit fingerprint by 
fabricating the circuit with the flexibility that whether or not applying the local 
change does not affect functionality. In both methods, the design will be modified 
such that fingerprints, in the form of different layouts such as library cells and wires, 
can be generated at the post-silicon stage. While these methods are practical, they 
incur large design overhead in circuit area and delay. 
3.4 Scan Chain based Fingerprinting Technique 
      We utilize the Q-SD and Q’-SD connection styles between SFFs to create the 
fingerprint for a design in the following steps [44]: 
Step 1. Perform the normal scan design to obtain the best possible solution. This 




coverage; (2) the order of the scan chain, that is, which SFF will be the next for a 
given SFF; (3) the connection style between each two SFFs.  
Step 2. Identify the fingerprint locations. By deliberately choosing whether two 
adjacent flip-flops have a Q-SD or a Q’-SD connection, we can create a bit of 
information for the fingerprint.  If the design has n flip-flops in its scan chain, we can 
embed any of the 2n possible n-bit fingerprints. Therefore, the challenging question 
is: how to select k pairs of SFFs as fingerprint locations to minimize the performance 
overhead in the fingerprinted copies.  
Step 3. Develop fingerprint embedding protocols. This can be as simple as the one in 
the illustrative example where 0 and 1 are embedded as Q-SD and Q’-SD connection 
styles respectively. But a good fingerprint embedding protocol should balance (1) low 
design cost, (2) low or no performance degradation, (3) easy detectability, and (4) 
high robustness and resilience.  
Step 4. Modify the set of test vectors. While fingerprints are in the forms of Q-SD or 
Q’-SD connection styles, we want to maintain the test vectors’ fault coverage. 
Therefore, the set of test vectors have to be updated based on the fingerprint 
embedded in the design, as shown in the illustrative example in Section 3.2. 
In the rest of this section, we elaborate the last three steps and how to verify the 
fingerprints 
3.4.1 Identify Fingerprinting Locations 
      Besides fault coverage, a circuit’s power consumption during test is another 




use the Q-SD or Q’-SD style to connect two adjacent SFFs in order to minimize the 
switching activities, and hence power consumption [45]. At the ith position (output of 
the ith SFF) of the scan chain, let Cost
i
Q
  be the total number of transitions when Q-SD 
connection style is used and Cost
i
Q'
  be the total number of transitions when the 
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where n is the size of the scan chain, Input
i
dif
  and Output
i
dif
  are variables for number of 
times that consecutive bits differ (“01” or “10”) at position i for all the test vectors and 
their output responses, respectively. Input
i
same
  and Output
i
same
  are similarly defined 
when consecutive bits are the same (“00” or “11”). The optimal connection style type 
for each position is determined by comparing the values of Cost
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Q
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     Once a fingerprinting location is chosen, its connection style will be decided by 
the value of the fingerprint bit, which will be random. Therefore we choose the 






 | to keep the power overhead caused by distinct 
fingerprints at the minimal level. 
3.4.2 Fingerprint Creation 
      After we choose k fingerprint locations, we can embed any k-bit fingerprint. 




fingerprint locations and make changes on the SFF connection styles or on the test 
vectors to alter or remove the fingerprint. To counter this attack, we propose to create 
the fingerprint bits by the following data integrity technique: (1) start with an m-bit 
fingerprint with m ≤ k, (2) use this m-bit fingerprint as the seed to generate m’ bits by 
a one-way hash function, (3) use the (m + m’) bits as the fingerprint to guide the 
selection of Q-SD or Q’-SD connection styles at the selected fingerprint locations. 
This completes the fingerprinted scan design and we will discuss its security in the 
next section. 
      Next, we need to modify test vectors for each fingerprinted scan design to keep the 
fault coverage. For this, we have 
Lemma. Let x1x2…xn be an input test vector for the original scan design; y1y2…yn 
be the corresponding output test vector. If a fingerprinted scan has altered the 
connection styles at SFF positions p1, p2, .., pk, then the following input test vector 
z1z2…zn will provide the same fault coverage on this fingerprinted scan  as x1x2…xn 
does in the original scan:  
  zi = xi  if i ∈[1, p1] ∪[p2,p3] ∪[p4,p5] ∪ … 
  zi = x’i otherwise 
The corresponding output test vector w1w2…wn on this fingerprinted scan is given by:  
  wi = yi  if i ∈[pk, n] ∪[pk-2,pk-1] ∪[pk-4,pk-3] ∪ … 




We omit the proof of this Lemma due to simplicity. One can easily verify this for the 
example in Table 1. 
3.4.3 Fingerprint Detection 
      There are two ways to detect the fingerprint bits embedded by the above method. 
First, if the design is not altered, we can simply check the input/output pair of test 
vector on the fingerprinted design and compare it with the original design to 
determine the fingerprint bits. The data integrity technique enables us to further verify 
whether the fingerprint bits have been modified. To do this, we first recover the first 
m bits, then re-generate the hash bits and compare with the remaining m’ bits. If we 
find a mismatch or other evidence that the design might have been altered, we can 
open up the chip and check the connection styles to confirm it, which is the second 
method to detect the embedded fingerprint. 
3.5 Security Analysis 
      In this section, we first briefly explain why both IP owners and users need to be 
protected and how our proposed scan chain based fingerprinting technique achieves 
such protection. Then we conduct a security analysis of our fingerprinting method on 
the potential attacks and the corresponding countermeasures. 
      Both the IP owners and legal IP customers need to protect their rights. IP 
designers want assurance that their designs will not be illegally redistributed by 
customers and customers also want to ensure what they bought is legitimate and 




design is resold without the owner’s approval, the involved users should be tracked 
and punished, not other IP users.  
      Our approach can easily be implemented by local rewiring to determine a specific 
connection style of certain pairs of scan cells. Since such changes are local and do not 
require scan chain reordering or rerouting (as needed for existing approaches), they 
will not cause high design overhead. However, we need to modify test vectors 
because different fingerprinting configurations of the Q-SD and Q’-SD connections 
will change the flip-flop contents for testing. As we have discussed earlier, this can be 
easily accomplished by the Lemma in section 3.4.2. Meanwhile, this gives us an 
alternative way to detect fingerprints: instead of physically de-packaging the chip and 
verifying the connection styles, we can conveniently determine the fingerprint by 
checking the test vectors. 
    A naïve attack on the proposed approach would be to send out ones and zeros 
through the scan chain, trying to figure out the connection styles to reveal 
fingerprints. However, it is infeasible to learn the connection styles by merely 
observing the scan out results. For example, for a 5-stage scan chain, if the attacker 
scans in “00000” and then gets “00000” from the SO port, the possible connection 
style might be “00000”, “00011”, “01111” et al. as long as the number of different 
bits between each style is even. It would be unlikely to determine which way the scan 
chain is truly implemented if the scan chain is long enough. Thus this attack does not 
work. Next we analyze various possible attacks and discuss briefly how the proposed 





3.5.1 Fingerprint Denial 
      The adversary may conceive to simply deny that the fingerprint information has 
been inserted. Instead, he may declare that the fingerprint is merely a coincidence 
without changing the functionality or performance of the IC. We could defeat this 
attack by proving that the probability of such coincidence is sufficiently low. In the 
proposed scheme, it is reasonable to assume that the connection style of each position 
in scan chain can be two alternative connection styles with the same probability. 
Thus, the probability that a non-fingerprinted design carries a specific m-bit 
fingerprint will be 1/2m. Obviously, a longer fingerprint indicates a stronger 
authorship proof. On the other hand, since the fingerprinted design would incur more 
or less power overhead compared to the optimized design [45], it will make no sense 
for a designer to choose a specific connection style which conflicts with that 
determined by optimization criteria if it is not specially designed for fingerprinting. 
3.5.2 Fingerprint Modification 
      In fingerprint modification attacks, apparently the adversary will attempt to 
modify the fingerprints. Our analysis is based on the two different detection methods 
in section 3.4.3.  
1) Detecting by checking test vectors 
     If we rely on checking the test vectors to identify the embedded digital fingerprint, 
an adversary can arbitrarily change test vectors (and hence destroy the fingerprint) to 
make it difficult or impossible to identify the fingerprint in this way. It is normally 




lower fault coverage.  Without proper test coverage, a circuit may malfunction and 
the end user may not know. Furthermore, it becomes meaningless when we view the 
layout in the chip to check fingerprint locations.  
2) Detecting by opening up chips 
      If it is possible for us to open up the chip to verify fingerprints, it will be 
reasonable to assume that attackers will have the same capability and they can modify 
the interior structure of the scan chain. In this case, the attacker can randomly change 
the connection styles between SFFs, the same way we embed a fingerprint, to destroy 
the fingerprint.  
      The data integrity technique proposed in section 3.4.2 can be used to defeat these 
attacks. By making fingerprint bits dependent, we not only allow the fingerprint to be 
verified, but also make it difficult for the attacker to forge. A successful forgery 
requires both the m-bit seed and the m’-bit hash to be changed consistently. Although 
it is possible to change the connection styles between SFFs, it will be challenging to 
make the change which can maintain the property that the m’ bits are the hash of the 
first m bits. 
      Another powerful attack to any fingerprinting method is the so-called collusion 
attack. In such an attack, the attacker has multiple copies of the ICs with different 
fingerprints. He can compare the SFF connection styles of these ICs and find the 
differences of their connection styles to reveal some fingerprinting locations. Once 




integrity approach can detect attacks where connection styles are arbitrarily changed. 
Therefore, such copies will not be considered authentic. 
3.5.3 Fingerprint Removal 
      This attack refers to the case when an attacker can retrieve the original design 
without any fingerprint. This will be impossible when an attacker can only access the 
input/output test vector pairs. The best an attacker can do in that case are those listed 
in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. However, when an attacker is capable of opening up the 
chip, he can certainly make all the connections to be Q-SD to remove the fingerprint. 
We mention that this might be practical for IP blocks of small size, but for very large 
scale ICs, the efforts of de-packaging the chip and reverse engineering to obtain the 
netlist will be very expensive, making it unlikely for them to remove the fingerprinted 
scan chain and redesign the circuit without any fingerprint. 
3.6 Experimental Results 
       In the experiment, we used the Design Compiler under Synopsys to synthesize 
and obtain netlists from the designs from ISCAS89, ISCAS99 and LGSynth93 
benchmark suites. Detailed information about the benchmark circuit is given in Table 
2. The second column denotes the number of flip-flops in the circuit, in other words, 
the length of the scan chain. ‘Torg’ in the third column indicates the number of 
transitions during testing by the originally optimized scan design, respectively. The 
DfT Compiler and TetraMax under Synopsys are, respectively, used to create the 
original scan chain and generate the test patterns. The 10-bit and 128-bit fingerprints 




on a 3GHz HP Z620 work station with Linux operating system and 12 GB of 
memory. 
 
Table 2: Information of benchmark circuits from ISCAS89, ISCAS99 and 
LGSynth93 
 
Circuit Number of flip-flops Torg 
S38584 1166 3.31E+08 
S38417 1564 1.13E+09 
S35932 1728 6.72E+07 
B17 1315 2.31E+09 
B17_1 1316 2.31E+09 
B18 2908 2.45E+10 
B18_1 2904 2.30E+10 
B19 5816 1.55E+11 
B19_1 5709 1.44E+11 
DMA 1831 2.21E+09 
usb_funct 1517 1.30E+09 
ac97_ctrl 1876 6.73E+08 
pci_bridge32_1 1485 9.30E+08 
pci_bridge32_2 1828 1.40E+09 
des_perf 8808 1.32E+10 
ethernet 10015 1.37E+11 
vga_lcd 16904 1.59E+12 





      Table 3 and 4 show the fingerprinting results on the ISCAS and LGSynth93 
benchmark circuits using the proposed fingerprinting method. ∆T represents the 
percentage increments from Torg to Tfp, where Tfp denotes the number of transitions 
during testing by the fingerprinted scan design. The column, ‘n’ under that of ‘∆T’ 
denotes the maximum number of connections among N connections that can be 
altered by fingerprinting while maintaining the overhead on transitions smaller than 
∆T. To evaluate the overhead due to multiple different fingerprints, we use the 
pseudo-random generator to generate 10 random numbers between [1...n] to index 10 
connections among the n qualified connections. We then compute the average and 
worst case overhead of transitions caused by the 1024 different fingerprinted designs, 
which are implemented by different configurations of the 10 selected connections. 
The columns ‘∆AT’ and ‘∆WT’ denote the average overhead and worst case overhead 
of transitions respectively. Table 3 and 4 give the transition overheads introduced by 
10-bit small size fingerprints. We can see that for a design, a smaller ∆T corresponds 
to a smaller n, which means a smaller pool of the qualified connections. To guarantee 
the overhead less than 0.1%, at least 70 qualified connections (in the design S35932) 
can be found. This can enable a sufficiently large pool of 270 fingerprints. Also, the 
average overhead of 1024 different fingerprinted design can be controlled within 
0.007%. The average of worst case overhead is no more than 0.014%. 









Table 3: Average Overheads of Transitions due to 1024 different fingerprints on 
Benchmark Circuits, where  ∆BT, ∆AT and ∆WT denote the best, average and worst 
case overhead respectively. 
Circuit 
∆T= 1% ∆T=0.5% 
n ∆AT(%) ∆WT(%) n ∆AT(%) ∆WT(%) 
S38584 458 1.11E-02 2.21E-02 329 7.07E-03 1.41E-02 
S38417 599 9.06E-03 1.81E-02 426 7.96E-03 1.59E-02 
S35932 231 1.41E-02 2.81E-02 161 1.38E-02 2.75E-02 
B17 366 1.69E-02 3.38E-02 266 1.11E-02 2.21E-02 
B17_1 383 1.23E-02 2.45E-02 285 5.46E-03 1.09E-02 
B18 1059 4.70E-03 9.41E-03 779 3.69E-03 7.37E-03 
B18_1 1069 3.21E-03 6.41E-03 782 3.26E-02 6.52E-03 
B19 2306 1.88E-03 3.75E-03 1770 1.30E-03 2.61E-03 
B19_1 2263 2.57E-03 5.13E-03 1735 1.39E-03 2.78E-03 
DMA 793 5.03E-03 1.01E-02 572 5.19E-03 1.04E-02 
usb_funct 456 8.53E-03 1.71E-02 326 6.89E-03 1.38E-02 
ac97_ctrl 599 9.13E-03 1.83E-02 426 7.73E-03 1.55E-02 
pci_bridge32_1 661 9.40E-03 1.88E-02 474 5.72E-03 1.14E-02 
pci_bridge32_2 786 6.51E-03 1.30E-02 563 4.26E-03 8.52E-03 
des_perf 3575 1.29E-03 2.57E-03 2550 7.91E-04 1.58E-03 
ethernet 2042 2.76E-03 5.52E-03 1609 1.45E-03 2.90E-03 
vga_lcd 7056 5.30E-04 1.06E-03 5978 4.16E-04 8.32E-04 







Table 4: Average Overheads of Transitions due to 1024 different fingerprints on 
Benchmark Circuits, where  ∆BT, ∆AT and ∆WT denote the best, average and worst 
case overhead respectively. 
Circuit 
∆T=0.2% ∆T=0.1% 
n ∆AT(%) ∆WT(%) n ∆AT(%) ∆WT(%) 
S38584 207 5.46E-03 1.09E-02 148 4.00E-03 8.01E-03 
S38417 276 3.22E-03 6.44E-03 199 2.21E-03 4.42E-03 
S35932 101 1.26E-02 2.51E-02 70 8.76E-03 1.75E-02 
B17 168 7.48E-03 1.50E-02 120 3.16E-03 6.32E-03 
B17_1 185 4.35E-03 8.70E-03 135 3.91E-03 7.82E-03 
B18 500 1.81E-03 3.62E-03 355 1.16E-03 2.31E-03 
B18_1 500 1.81E-03 3.63E-03 353 1.40E-03 2.80E-03 
B19 1156 7.39E-04 1.48E-03 826 7.30E-04 1.46E-03 
B19_1 1133 6.85E-04 1.37E-03 803 6.88E-04 1.38E-03 
DMA 373 2.08E-03 4.16E-03 269 1.65E-03 3.30E-03 
usb_funct 205 4.65E-03 9.30E-03 142 2.93E-03 5.86E-03 
ac97_ctrl 268 3.96E-03 7.93E-03 188 2.71E-03 5.41E-03 
pci_bridge32_1 301 3.57E-03 7.13E-03 212 2.70E-03 5.40E-03 
pci_bridge32_2 359 2.19E-03 4.38E-03 255 2.04E-03 4.09E-03 
des_perf 1622 6.79E-04 1.36E-03 1154 4.49E-04 8.98E-04 
ethernet 1079 1.08E-03 2.15E-03 771 6.95E-04 1.39E-03 
vga_lcd 3993 3.21E-04 6.42E-04 2862 1.85E-04 3.70E-04 





      Figure 10 demonstrates the overhead of transitions due to 100 different 128-bit 
fingerprints. ∆BT, ∆AT and ∆WT denote the best, average and worst case overhead 
respectively. We select 6 typical benchmark circuits with scan chain length of 1166, 
1876, 2908, 5816, 8808, 16904 in Figure 10. In this case, 128 random numbers 
between [1…n] are generated to index 128 fingerprinting positions. After 
fingerprinting locations are determined, we randomly choose 100 connection styles 
out of all the possible connection styles to test the transition overhead by large size 
fingerprints. From Figure 10, we can see that the overhead is negligible for circuits 
with long scan chains. The worst case transition increments are less than 0.05% when 
scan chain length is longer than 5816 (B19). The overhead becomes lower when the 
circuit has a longer scan chain. On the other hand, for designs with relatively short 
scan chains, the result shows our proposed scheme could also control the worst case 
overhead under 0.18% (S38584 with scan chain length of 1166). In addition, the 
difference between best and worst case overhead is quite small, which indicates that 
the overhead is predictable and well controlled in our fingerprinting scheme. 
3.7 Summary 
      Scan  chain  fingerprinting  is  an  ideal  solution  to  fingerprinting  circuits  that  
utilize  scan-chains  for  DFT.    The  overhead  is  minimal  as  its  only  real  effect  
is  to  increase  the  power  usage  of  the  device  during  testing.    This  method  can  
also  create  fingerprints  with  more  than  sufficient  length  for most  production  
lines.    With  this  we  can  create  larger  than  necessary  fingerprints  that  can  
either  be  entangled  or  simply  include  more  information,  making  it  more  







Figure 10: Overheads of transitions on six circuits due to 100 different 128-bit 
fingerprints. The scan chain length of these six circuits are 1166, 1876, 2908, 5816, 
8808, 16904 respectively. For each circuit, we show the overheads under the 




Chapter 4: RSN based IC Identification for Embedded Device 
4.1 Identification of Embedded and IoT Devices 
      The notion of embedded systems has been around for about half a century and it 
boomed in the late 1990’s when the embedded devices were networked. With the 
continuing advances and the convergence of multiple technologies, ranging from 
wireless communication to the Internet and from embedded systems to micro-
electromechanical systems, the Internet of Things (IoT) emerged in the last decade in 
the form of large volumes of embedded devices connected by the Internet 
infrastructure to perform specific applications.  Since then, IoT has been growing 
with an unprecedented pace and found applications in medical and healthcare 
monitoring, smart home and building surveillance, as well as in nation-wide 
infrastructures such as power grid, transportation systems, and environmental 
monitoring systems.  
      Security and privacy are among the key concerns for the development of IoT 
applications. It is pointed out that both the IoT and its Things are developed rapidly 
without appropriate consideration of the profound security challenges involved and 
the regulatory changes that might be necessary [47, 48]. A January 2014 article 
in Forbes listed many Internet-connected appliances that can already "spy on people 
in their own homes" including televisions, kitchen appliances, cameras, and 
thermostats [49].  Embedded devices in automobiles such as brakes, engines, locks, 
hood and truck releases, horn, heat, and dashboard have been shown to be vulnerable 




vehicle-to-infrastructure communication makes everyone’s driving habit and daily 
commute routing public [50]. 
      The serial number is perhaps the most popular and one of the earliest ways for IC 
identification. A serial number can be physically indented on the device or stored 
permanently in the memory. However, the fact that it can be easily removed or forged 
makes it unsuitable to countermeasure IP theft such as illegal reproduction, 
redistribution, and foundry overbuilding. 
      Several intrinsic unclonable IC tagging schemes based on silicon manufacture 
variation have been proposed. In [42], a technique was created to determine a 
circuit’s fingerprint through its glitches. In [43], the delay path variations are used to 
create the fingerprint for a circuit. Recently, a circuit identification method was 
presented in [52], where the authors embed chip IDs by replacing standard cells in the 
netlist with partial polymorphic gates. Upon activation of the control signal, the 
polymorphic gates will behave differently for certain input combinations and thus can 
be used to authenticate the chip. The unique challenge response pairs created by the 
physical unclonable functions have also been used for IC identification. These 
approaches are based on intrinsic fabrication variations, but they cannot detect IP 
theft because illegally copied or over-built ICs will have different variations and 
hence different identifications from the original copy. Therefore, the IP cannot be 
traced and authenticated. 
      Mathematically strong and well-developed cryptographic techniques exist for all 
kinds of security related applications such as data encryption/decryption, user and 




security primitives or protocols are (extremely) computationally expensive (for 
example, performing the modular exponentiation operation for large numbers of 
hundreds of bits). Unfortunately, in the IoT domains, the devices are resource 
constrained and do not have the required computational power, memory, or (battery) 
power for such operations. As a result, in many IoT applications, both data and 
control communications, such as those between wearable/implantable medical 
devices and doctors or patients, are in plain text, which creates serious vulnerabilities. 
4.2 RSN based IC Identification: Idea and Advantages 
      Reconfigurable scan architectures have been proposed [53] for decades. 
Compared to traditional scan design, RSNs allow flexible and scalable access to on-
chip instrumentations in case of large scale integration, while significantly reducing 
test time. Recently, RSN with nearly arbitrary structure and functionality has been 
standardized by the IEEE P1687 [37]. The first generalized model enabling efficient 
formal verification and automatic generation of access patterns was presented in [54], 
which applies to a wide range of RSN architectures. 
      In this chapter, we propose a hardware security primitive as an alternative 
solution to the security of embedded and IoT devices. We utilize the testing 
infrastructure in these devices, which is compliant with IEEE 1149.1-2013 [36] and 
IEEE P1687 (IJTAG) [37], to create a unique identifier at the circuit level for each 
device which can be verified through a standard testing interface. More specifically, 
we adopt RSN and develop a fingerprint protocol to configure distinct RSN for each 
IC by utilizing the different connection styles between scan flip-flops. The testing 




configurations and thus can be used as IC identification (ID). In addition, these IDs 
can be used to fingerprint the design or intellectual property (IP), they can facilitate 
IP metering and tracking, and they can also be used as the key for lightweight 
encryption and decryption.  
      The different connection styles in scan chain have been used in the literature for 
IP watermarking [46] and IP fingerprinting [51]. However, IP cores are highly used, 
in the forms of hard IP or firm IP, in the design of embedded and IoT devices [5]. The 
design details of these IP cores are unavailable; therefore, the previous IP protection 
techniques [46, 51] cannot be applied as they require changes to be made inside the IP 
cores. In our approach, we take advantage of the fact that such devices are tested by 
RSN and create unique device IDs at RSN without going into the IP cores. We apply 
it to the standard industrial design interface and demonstrate its usability in providing 
lightweight security for embedded and IoT devices. We analyze our approach to show 
that it will not introduce any design or performance overhead. Meanwhile, study on 
the ITC’02 benchmark indicates that the RSN configuration can easily accommodate 
107 to 10186 unique device IDs. 
4.3 RSN Based IC Identification Technique 
      Our IC identification scheme is built on top of the SIB-based RSNs as shown in 
Figure 11. It takes advantage of the fact that shift register S and shadow register U in 
each SIB can be chained by either the Q-D or the Q'-D connection style [21, 46]. In 
this approach, if the Q-D connection is used to chain S and U registers, the embedded 
ID bit is ‘0’, and if the Q'-D connection is used, the corresponding ID bit would be ‘1’. 




      Suppose that the original design only uses Q-D connections for all SIBs in the 
RSN. Then, the chip ID of this design would be all 0s. To generate a new chip ID, the 
designer has the option of choosing among existing SIBs to modify their S/U 
connection styles. If k SIBs exist in the design, the designer can create unique digital 
IDs for up to 2k chips. 
As one might notice, when a Q’-D connection is used for S/U connection of an 
SIB, the negated value of S will be loaded to U during an update operation, which 
would make the original test inputs incorrect. Therefore, to ensure that all the 
instruments can be tested correctly, we need to adjust the test vectors for scan 
segments whose SIBs have been modified (Q’-D connection is used for their S/U 
registers). The adjustment only needs to be made to the test input which is shifted in 
during each update operation. We refer to this test input as configuration sequence as 
it determines the scan network topology after its corresponding update operation. 
      To adjust each configuration sequence, the following rules need to be followed 
 




for each bit in the sequence. 
Rule 1. If the bit corresponds to an SIB whose S/U connection style is Q’-D, 
the value of this bit should be set to ‘0’ for activating the directing mode and to 
‘1’ for enabling the bypassing mode. 
Rule 2. If the bit corresponds to an SIB whose S/U connection style is Q-D, 
the value of this bit should be set to ‘1’ for activating the directing mode and to 
‘0’ for enabling the bypassing mode. 
      These rules make sure that no matter what the style of S/U connection is in each 
SIB, always the correct value is stored in the shadow register and scan networks can 
be configured correctly. In the scan network depicted in Figure 12, suppose that the 
original design uses Q-D connections for all three SIBs, i.e. the design carries an ID 
value of ‘000’.  In this case, to access only scan segments 1 and 3, a configuration 
sequence of ‘101’ should be shifted in before the update operation. As mentioned 
before, this configuration sequence only works for this specific ID, and if the S/U 
connection style of any SIB changes, this sequence needs to be modified. For 
example, if an ID equal to ‘101’ is assigned to the scan network in Figure 12, the 




      Compared to the existing IC identification methods, our approach offers four 
advantages. First, it is practical as the ID bit locations in the scan network can be 
selected before fabrication, and the assignment of digital IDs are done at post 
fabrication stage. Therefore, all the designs can be fabricated with the same mask. 
Second, it incurs negligible overhead since the identification bits are added in the 
scan network, which will not affect the performance of core design. Third, it offers an 
additional non-destructive verification method which unlike other existing methods 
does not require de-packaging of the IC. Finally, and most importantly, it does not 
require any scan chain information from each of the IP cores and is suitable for 
embedded devices.  
 
Figure 12: An example SIB based RSN for demonstrating test input adjustments. 
 
 





4.3.1 Implementation       
      To implement the presented chip identification method, we propose to replace 
each original SIB in the design with a slightly different version of SIB called ID-SIB. 
The only change we made on the original SIB is that the connection style of ID-SIB’s 
S and U registers can be programmed in post-fabrication stage, as shown in Figure 13. 
The connection programming is done by blowing up one of the two fuses of each ID-
SIB in the scan network. In Figure 13, if the designer blows fuse F2, the S/U 
connection will be a Q-D style, and the corresponding identification bit for this ID-
SIB would be ‘0’, and if she chooses to blow the other fuse, the connection would be 
of Q’-D style, and the ID bit would be equal to ‘1’. 
4.3.2 Security Analysis 
      To analyze the security of IC identification schemes, researchers consider two 
attack scenarios, ID modification and ID removal. For our chip identification scheme, 
the removal attack can be perceived as an instance of modification attack, for 
removing the chip ID, i.e. changing all the Q’-D connections in SIBs back to Q-D 
connections can be viewed as a modification attack targeting chip ID of all 0s. 
Therefore, in this section, we only focus on the ID modification attacks.  
      In ID modification attacks, adversary’s goal is to change the ID of the chip. One 
possible motivation for an adversary to mount these type of attacks is to resale the chip 
to blacklisted customers for higher prices and avoid getting detected by the chip 
vendor. If the digital IDs of illegally distributed chips are not modified, the identity of 





      An adversary can mount ID modification attacks, only if he is capable of de-
packaging, reverse engineering the chip and changing the connections of S and U 
registers in ID-SIBs. While we believe these assumptions about capabilities of 
adversaries are not realistic, especially in case of very large-scale ICs, we suggest 
choosing ID bits by the data integrity technique proposed in our previous work [51] to 
eliminate the possibility of such powerful attacks. Based on this technique, embedding 
ID bits for an IC is a 4 step process: (1): choose N ID bit locations, and replace the 
corresponding SIBs with ID-SIBs, (2): choose random values for m ID bits with m < 
N, (3): use this m-bit ID and an IC-specific key (KIC) as the input to a one-way hash 
function to generate (N-m) bits, (4): use the final N bits as the ID bits to guide the 
selection of S/U connection styles at the selected ID locations. In this technique, the 
location of the m-bit ID and the value of the KIC should be kept private to the IC 
vendor.  
      The proposed data integrity technique makes it difficult for the attacker to forge a 
chip ID, since a successful forgery requires knowing the value of KIC and the exact 
location of the m-bit ID, which are only known to the IC vendor. Although it is 
possible for the adversary to change the connection styles between S and U registers 
in ID-SIBs, it will be challenging to make the correct changes that can maintain the 
property between ID bits. 
4.4 Experimental Results 
      To validate our proposed IC identification scheme, we first see how many unique 
device IDs can be generated with our approach for real life circuits. Then, we discuss 




4.4.1 Benchmark Circuits 
      To evaluate our identification scheme, we use the SIB based RSN benchmarks 
described in [54] which are based on ITC’02 SOC benchmark set [55]. Each ITC’02 
benchmark circuit is specified by the modules in the SOC and their hierarchical 
structure, and modules are described by the numbers of their input, output, 
bidirectional terminals, scan chains and their lengths, test sets, and the (x, y) 
coordinate of their center on the SOC layout. 
In the SIB based scan network benchmarks, two scan registers are designated for 
input and output pins of each module. In this design, doorway SIBs include or 
exclude lower level submodules, and instrument SIBs connect or bypass scan 
segments, depending on the input and output scan registers of each module from the 
active scan path as described in [56]. In Table 5, the details of the ITC’02 SOC 
benchmarks and their corresponding SIB based RSN designs are listed. 
4.4.2 Potential in Creating Unique IDs 
As described in section 4.3.1, to embed the identification bits, each SIB in the scan 
network needs to be replaced with an ID-SIB. Therefore, the number of potential ID 
bits for each chip is equal to the number of SIBs in its scan network, which is given in 
Table 5. As one can see in Table 5, with the exception of q127110, all the other 
benchmark circuits can potentially embed a good number of ID bits with the 
minimum of 40 bits (A586710) and maximum of 621 (P93791) ID bits, which 
correspond to 1.09x1012 and 8.70x10186 unique device IDs, respectively. Even in the 
minimum case, 1.09x1012 is a couple orders of magnitude higher than the number of 




4.4.3 Design Overhead 
      The proposed IC and device identification approach has negligible performance 
overhead as the digital ID bits are only added in the SIBs of the scan network, which 
wouldn’t cause any overhead to the IP core design. Moreover, the overhead incurred 
on testing instruments is also negligible since no extra hardware is integrated into the 
design, and all the changes are local which avoids rerouting. For different RSN 
configurations, the testing vector can be justified, which is a one-time cost, so there 
will no change in test coverage. 
Table 5: Characteristics of the ITC'02 Benchmarks and their corresponding SIB based 
Scan Networks. 
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      In this chapter, we proposed a novel IC identification approach which, compared 
to other existing schemes, is more practical, has lower design overhead and provides 
a non-destructive verification method. This method takes advantage of the difference 
connection styles in the scan chain to create unique device IDs. The testing vectors 
will be justified accordingly to maintain the test coverage, which becomes one way 
for the authentication of the device ID. It can be conveniently implemented on 
embedded and IoT devices to utilize their testing infrastructure compliant with IEEE 
1149.1-2013 and IEEE P1687 (IJTAG). Experimental results indicate that on standard 
benchmark circuits, we can generate unique device IDs a couple of orders of 




Chapter 5:  Public-Private Partial Scan Chains 
5.1 Rationale of Using Partial Scan Chain to Prevent Information Leak 
      Computer hardware has long been an attractive target for attackers to hack into 
any computing and communication system. Starting from the legendary power 
analysis attacks discovered 20 years ago [25] to the recent Intel Spectre [57] and 
Meltdown [58], the USENIX 2017 best paper winner CLKSCREW [59], the CCS 
2017 best paper winner dolphin attack [60], the S&P 2016 best paper winner A2 
hardware Trojan [61], security vulnerabilities in hardware design have been exploited 
for malicious purposes such as stealing sensitive information and gaining 
unauthorized control of the system. With the emerging IoT applications, where the 
devices are extremely resource constrained, many proven secure but computationally 
expensive cryptography protocols cannot be applied on such devices. Thus there is an 
urgent need to understand the hardware vulnerabilities and develop cost effective 
mitigation methods. 
      One established field in the semiconductor and integrated circuit (IC) industry, 
known as IC test, has the goal of ensuring that fabricated ICs are free of 
manufacturing defects and perform required functionalities. The concept of DFT has 
been integrated in the commercial IC design and fabrication for several decades. As 
its name suggests, DFT is to add test and debug features during design time in order 
to (1) reduce test time complexity, (2) improve test’s fault coverage, and (3) enable 
in-field test and debug (that is the capability to test and debug after an IC is 




      Test engineers need to access internal information of a system or an IC, such as 
the contents of registers, so as to diagnose the source of failures. Furthermore, they 
need a means to control a system’s internal state to facilitate test. Scan chain is one of 
the most successful DFT techniques and can be found in almost all the modern 
designs. As we have introduced in Chapter 2, a scan chain basically connects all the 
flip-flops, which are the fundamental memory units that can store one bit of 
information, to form a chain and provides a scan in (SI) port and a scan out (SO) port 
to offer test engineers full controllability and observability of the scan chain and 
therefore system states for testing purpose. A test scan-enable signal is added to 
control whether the system is running in normal mode or test mode. The backbone of 
industrial DFT supports is based on a scan chain through the interface of JTAG [62]. 
      Ironically, attackers have the same motivation as test engineers, that is, gaining 
controllability and/or observability of the system, but for malicious purposes. Scan 
chain gives them a perfect side channel to penetrate into a system through the JTAG 
interface. Cryptographic keys have been successfully cracked with information 
obtained from scan chain on many secure systems, including DES [28], AES [30], 
ECC [31], and RSA [32]. During test, by exploiting controllability and observability, 
it becomes theoretically easy to set values of flip-flops on the scan chain and 
consequently force the system into any state that an attacker wants to have [33, 34]. 
We will elaborate these attacks and their countermeasures in the next section. Here 
we just mention that existing countermeasures are mainly based on either controlling 




values to confuse the attackers [63-66]. Inevitably these will introduce inconvenience 
and overhead against the aforementioned three primary objectives for IC test.   
      In this part of the dissertation, we propose a novel approach that can effectively 
defeat all the existing scan chain based attacks. The idea behind our approach is quite 
straightforward: if you want to protect sensitive information and system states, then 
simply do not leak such information through the scan chain, no matter whether it is 
encrypted/obfuscated or not. The rationale is similar to that in the tag game, known as 
Marco-Polo, played in the pool: if no one answers “Polo” to the call of “Marco”, the 
seeker will have no clue of how to tag other players. More specifically, traditional 
scan chain design has all the flip-flops connected in sequence to form a full scan 
chain. This provides test engineers the access to each flip-flop, resulting in full test 
coverage. But it also gives attackers full controllability and observability on the scan 
chain en route to access and control the system. In our approach, we will build a 
partial scan chain which does not contain certain flip-flops, such as those storing 
sensitive data. This completely denies the attacker’s accessibility and controllability 
on the un-chained flip-flops.  
      This concept of partial scan chain is not new. It has been used in IC test mainly to 
reduce the time complexity of test [80]. However, it fails to provide the test coverage 
that a full scan chain could have because test engineers cannot access those flip-flops 
that are not on the partial scan chain. This can be a serious problem for IC test. 
Sequential ATPG has been introduced as a solution for this, but it has many 
drawbacks including the increased test time, test power, and the inability to provide 




propose a novel approach that integrates partial scan chain design with a hardware 
implemented auxiliary FSM and some obfuscation circuitry in order to deliver secure 
scan chains with provable full test coverage.  
      Our approach features the following characteristics: first, by the design of partial 
scan chain, it is secure against all the known scan chain based attacks. Second, we 
develop a set of techniques to guarantee that all the original test vectors can be 
applied on the new secure partial scan in order to provide the same test coverage. 
Third, we propose a protocol to enable in-field test capability. It can be shown that 
potentially we can reduce both test time and test power, the two most important 
metrics for IC test. Finally, our design incurs chip area overhead to implement the 
auxiliary FSM and the obfuscation circuitry. Although the overhead on FSM is fixed 
and will become negligible as the size of the design increases, the overhead on the 
obfuscation circuitry could be proportional to the number of un-chained flip-flops. 
      In the remaining of this chapter, we first survey the existing scan chain based 
attacks and the reported countermeasures. Then we present the basic idea of our 
proposed public-private partial scan chain design and discuss the key challenges. We 
describe the general framework of this novel secure scan chain design and leave our 
answers to the design challenges to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
5.2 Scan Chain based Attacks and Countermeasures 
      In previous chapters, we have talked about all the advantages that scan chain has 
for testing purposes. Nevertheless, its security vulnerabilities have also been well-




observability of the system states, not only give test engineers the convenience of 
testing and debug, they also open a backdoor to attackers. In this section, we discuss 
the rationale of various attacks. A detailed survey of known scan based attacks and 
existing countermeasures is also presented. 
      Scan based attacks can be broadly classified according to whether the attacker 
takes advantages of the scan chain’s controllability or observability. Controllability 
offers an easy way for test engineers to apply test data from outside to the on-chip 
circuitry. However, it also allows malicious attackers to place the system to any state 
of their control, such as accessing certain protected states or scanning in corrupted 
data. This can be done with ease: set SE = 1 to force the system into test mode; 
configure the system to the desired state via SI port; reset SE = 0 to enter the normal 
functional mode to launch the attack. In other words, the attacker turns the SI port 
into a new channel for fault injection attacks [27]. It is easy to imagine that sensitive 
information from the keys used in the encryption algorithms to the functionality of 
the design can be easily extracted through such fault injection attacks. 
      On the other hand, observability refers to the capability to observe the contents of 
flip-flops deeply embedded in the design that would be hard to observe without scan 
chain. Clearly, attackers can also take advantage of this feature to obtain the internal 
states of the circuit at any point during test mode in a non-invasive manner. When 
crypto chips are performing encryption or decryption algorithms at the circuit level, 
some of the flip-flops on the scan chain will contain intermediate results of 
cryptographic computations. By switching the chip to test mode and then shifting out 




retrieve secret information. Most of the early scan based attacks that successfully 
cracked the proven secure encryption engines [28-32] belong to this category. The 
main threat of such attacks is that they can reduce the attacking efforts from years and 
months to days and hours [67].  
      Knowing that completely removing the access to scan chain is not an option, most 
of existing methods take one of the following approaches or some sort of 
combinations of the two. First, because scan based attacks need to switch between 
test mode and normal functional mode, it could be effective to tightly control when 
and how the SE signal is switched [30]. Second, almost all the scan based attacks rely 
on the observability of flip-flop contents from the SO port. Encryption and 
obfuscation methods have been proposed to confuse the attackers or limit their ability 
to understand the SO values [69-71].  
      Unfortunately, these approaches will introduce inconvenience and overhead for 
IC test, let alone the fact that they defer the scan design security to the security of 
encryption, obfuscation, and authentication protocols. Although there exist such 
proven secure protocols, their applicability to scan chain and in particular, scan chain 
on the resource constrained IoT devices is questionable. 
      In summary, scan test must be provided to both test engineers and end users, and 
it is desirable to allow them to apply new input test vectors. The security of scan 
chain cannot rely on controlling user’s access to the scan chain because the system 
will not be able to distinguish an attacker from a legitimate user. On the other hand, it 




Therefore, we need new countermeasures that can properly balance between security 
and testability (preferably full test coverage). 
       A lot of research efforts have been made to exploit the possible security 
loopholes due to the insertion of scan chain. Several scan-based attacks have been 
demonstrated. Hardware implementations of DES and AES are compromised that 
secret keys are discovered by differential attacks. Later, it was shown in [72] that scan 
chain also posed a security threat on stream ciphers. Meanwhile, public-key ciphers 
[31, 32] have been proven to be vulnerable to scan attacks. A survey paper 
summarizing the scan-based side-channel attacks was presented in [67]. It conducts a 
detailed investigation on the scan-based attacks on symmetric and public-key 
cryptographic hardware implementations. Various attack models are included and 
existing scan attack countermeasures are evaluated.    
5.2.1 Scan based Side Channel Attacks 
      The first scan attack in the literature was proposed in [28], targeting the hardware 
implementation of DES. This is a two-phase scheme. First, by loading pairs of known 
plaintexts with one-bit difference in functional mode, the attacker determines the 
internal structure of the scan chain, such as the locations of input registers, which 
keep the plaintexts, and intermediate registers which store the intermediate results of 
cryptographic computations. This is achieved by using the procedures of 
observability attack as we previously mentioned. Then after analyzing the DES 





      Later, an attack on AES [30] was proposed by the same authors. The first step is 
to locate the intermediate registers by differential attack, the same as that on DES 
[28]. Then by executing only the first round of the encryption algorithm in functional 
mode and further dividing the first round into each distinct operation for analysis, the 
authors found that if there are a certain number of 1s in the first round result, the input 
pairs at the Substitution-box’s input can be uniquely determined. By repeating the 
procedure, the attacker can recover the whole key. 
      Attacks against stream ciphers have also been presented. In [72], the Linear 
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) based stream ciphers are targeted. In this scenario, 
the attacker can run the CUT for a certain number of clock cycles and scan out the 
states of internal registers. By observing the bit in a fixed position of the scan-out 
vectors for several clock cycles, the attacker can discover the bit-by-bit 
correspondence between the LFSR and the scan-out vectors. Thus, the LFSR-based 
stream cipher can be cracked. 
      Not only are symmetric-key algorithms attacked, recently public key ciphers are 
also under scan-based attacks. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [31] and Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [32] are demonstrated to be susceptible to scan attacks. The 
procedures of observability attack are applied to get the values of intermediate results. 
Then the attacker monitors a 1-bit time-sequence in the scan path to locate the register 





5.2.2 Countermeasures to Scan based Attacks 
      A straightforward countermeasure to all scan based attacks is to unbound the scan 
chain after production [68]. However, this solution impedes the in-field diagnostic 
capabilities. Moreover, the scan chain can still be controlled and observed by 
physically probing the device. A similar approach is to limit the input test vectors to 
those that are provided by the chip maker. This will also prevent controllability 
attacks. But the cost of verifying the input test vectors could be very high given that 
there might be tens or hundreds of thousands test vectors. In addition, this will reduce 
the power of in-field test where the users may want to use some specific test vectors 
for diagnosis of potentially new faults.       
      In [69], a countermeasure called scan chain scrambling was introduced. The scan 
chain is first divided into small sub-chains. Then a multiplexer is inserted between 
scan chain segments. Under malicious attack, a random number generator is used to 
reconnect the sub-chains at a given frequency, which would produce unpredictable 
scan output. The main drawback of this method is the significant timing and area 
overhead it incorporates. Moreover, statistical analysis of the data scanned out from 
the chip can still reveal the scan structure and even the secret information. A lock & 
key technique was developed in [70], which was conceptually similar to the scan 
chain scrambling method. The scan chain is divided into smaller sub-chains of equal 
length. Instead of connecting the output of each sub-chain to the input of all other 
sub-chains by multiplexers, the lock & key scheme uses a seeded LFSR to randomly 
select a sub-chain to be filled by bits of the test vector when the key is incorrect. The 




chains can be very large. The same authors proposed another low-cost secure scan 
solution by integrating a test key into test vectors [71]. Dummy flip-flops are inserted 
in the design but not connected to the combinational circuits. LFSR is then used to 
randomize the scan-out response when an incorrect key is integrated into the test 
vector. Thus, any reverse engineering attempt based on the scan-out response would 
become unlikely. However, extra dummy flip-flops require modification of the scan 
insertion process. Meanwhile, the key being added would incur overhead in test time. 
      An interesting alternative was proposed in [30], where mirror key registers 
(MKR) were provided to prevent the secret key from entering the scan chain when in 
test mode. The authors define two modes of operation: insecure and secure mode. 
MKRs work like normal registers during insecure mode except that a special key 
instead of the actual secret key is loaded. Scan test can be normally operated. While 
in the secure mode, the MKRs load the actual secret key. In this scheme, the contents 
of MKRs cannot be scanned out since switching back from secure mode to insecure 
mode requires a power off reset. However, for systems where the key is hardwired 
instead of being stored in a non-volatile memory, the proposed method does not 
work. Furthermore, the duplication of the entire key would incur a relatively high 
hardware overhead. 
      Several countermeasures focus on directly disabling the scan-out operations [73, 
74]. An on-chip comparison is proposed in [73]. The scheme slightly changes the test 
procedure. Instead of shifting out test responses, the fault-free responses are shifted 
inside the circuit to be compared with the actual responses. Although the 




in [74] uses a sensor to count the number of cycles in functional mode. Scanning out 
responses is forbidden if the circuit has been in functional mode for several cycles, 
which indicates the test is not happening. In [81], inverters are added between scan 
flip-flops to obfuscate the contents of these flip-flops. However, inverting values 
becomes completely useless against differential scan attacks. 
5.3 Secure Partial Scan Chain: Idea and Challenges 
      As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, we observe that no matter how well 
existing countermeasures can protect the control over scan structure or obfuscate scan 
output, contents of flip-flops are still exposed to both test engineers and attackers and 
thus remain vulnerable. This leads us to the idea of removing certain flip-flops from 
the scan chain to create the so-called partial scan chain. These un-chained flip-flops 
are no longer accessible through the scan facilities such as SI and SO ports. Therefore 
information stored in these flip-flops will not leak outside the IC.  
      Figure 14 illustrates this partial scan chain idea. We can see that scan cell D1 is 
 
 
Figure 14: A partial scan chain where the second and fifth flip-flops are removed 




directly connected to D3 and D4 is directly connected to D6, leaving the two flip-flops, 
D2 and D5, outside of the scan chain and remain as normal D flip-flops. When the 
scan enable signal SE is disabled, all the flip-flops will work in the normal mode and 
get values from the CUT. In the test mode with SE enabled, the partial scan chain 
works without flip-flops D2 and D5. As a result, no one can control or observe the 
contents of these two flip-flops through the scan chain side channel. This will have 
zero information leakage on the data stored in the un-chained flip-flops and thus 
provide the highest security level. However, it also introduces several key challenges 
to IC test: 
Controllability Challenge. How to set input test vectors to these un-chained flip-
flops? In the traditional full scan chain, each flip-flop can receive its designated 
values through the SI port and the scan chain. In existing partial scan chain 
design, sequential ATPG is used to generate test vectors that are different from 
those for the full scan chain. This results in long test time and reduced test 
coverage. We aim to use the same input test vectors for full scan chain to keep 
full test coverage and thus facing the challenge of how to control the un-chained 
flip-flops.  
Observability Challenge. How to verify the output test vectors on these un-chained 
flip-flops? Similar to the controllability challenge, because the un-chained flip-
flops are not on the scan chain, we will not be able to observe their contents from 
the SO port. If these is any fault occurred in these flip-flops, we cannot detect it, 
resulting in the reduction of test coverage. However, exporting the contents of the 




securing scan chain from information leak. This is a problem that needs to be 
addressed. 
Security Challenge. How to solve the above two challenges without compromising 
the security provided by the un-chained flip-flops? What makes the 
controllability challenge and the observability challenge difficult is the 
requirement that any solution needs to ensure that the contents in the un-chained 
flip-flops are secure, which is the sole purpose of our partial scan chain. Secure 
analysis against both known scan chain attacks and other potential attacks 
targeting our proposed design needs to be conducted. 
      These challenges can be better understood after we describe the framework of 
public-private partial scan chain next. Then we will provide our solutions to these 
challenges in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, respectively.         
5.4 Framework of the Public-Private Scan Chains 
      The basic idea of securing the scan chain behind our approach is to remove flip-
flops that store sensitive information from the full scan chain in order to restrict the 
access to them through the SI and SO ports. In this section, we elaborate our partial 
scan designs as solutions to the challenge of designing secure partial scan while 
providing full test coverage. 
5.4.1 Generic Design of the Public-Private Partial Scan Chains 
      Removing certain flip-flops, which we will refer to as un-chained flip-flops, limits 
test engineer’s ability in testing the design. In order to guarantee the same full 




it will be necessary and sufficient to give test engineers both the controllability and 
observability of the un-chained flip-flops such that they can enter the input test vector 
into the CUT and then observe the test output to detect fault. Figure 15 depicts the 
generic structure of our proposed public-private partial scan chain. 
      On the top we have the public scan chain which is a normal partial scan chain 
contains flip-flops that do not need access control. Through the SI and SO ports, 
everyone can observe and control the values in these flip-flops when the scan chain is 
set in the test mode. The novelty in our approach is the private scan chain at the 
bottom, which provides both full test coverage and security as we will explain below. 
      First, to keep the same fault coverage as the full scan chain can provide with a 
given set of test vectors, the standard partial scan chain design method is to re-
generate test vectors based on only the flip-flops in the partial scan chain. The 
industrial tool known as sequential ATPG was developed for this purpose. However, 
this does not guarantee full test coverage, and can incur overhead in both test time 
and power. Therefore, we propose a different approach by building a private scan 
 





chain to connect all the un-chained flip-flops. This makes it possible to provide the 
full test coverage by using the same set of test vectors as in the case of full scan chain 
and also avoids the burden of re-generating test vectors. However, if we use the 
traditional SI and SO ports for the private scan chain, that will be the traditional 
multiple chain design and does not provide any security guarantee.  
      We observe that what the test engineers need is a way to enter the input test vector 
to each of the flip-flops, including those un-chained ones that are not on the public 
partial scan chain. As shown in Figure 15, we use a hardware implemented FSM to 
generate these input test vectors and then shift them into the un-chained flip-flops. 
The interface to the outside will be a control input port from which input values to the 
FSM can be entered in a sequence to direct the FSM to the target ending state. At the 
ending state, the flip-flops in the FSM will have values required in the test vector. We 
will elaborate this in Chapter 6. 
      For the same reason, the test engineer does not necessarily need to know the value 
of each flip-flop, as long as the output values from the chip matches the output test 
vector, the test is passed. Therefore, we propose to add an obfuscation unit to hide the 
real output values. Existing encryption and output scrambling methods are based on 
the same idea. Next, we outline the two different implementations of the obfuscation 
units and the detailed design will be described in Chapter 7.  
5.4.2 Private Chain with a Single Partial Scan Chain  
       Figure 16 shows the structure of the proposed public-private partial scan design 




 Block A: a public partial scan chain with n flip-flops that is controlled by the 
regular SI and contributes to but cannot be directly observed from the SO;  
 Block B: a private partial scan chain with the k un-chained flip-flops that we 
want to control access. These flip-flops are connected to the CUT but not to the 
SI/SO ports. The first l un-chained flip-flops are used to implement an FSM 
with additional combinational logic. An external control input CI is used to feed 
input to the FSM.  
 Block C: a set of l dummy flip-flops that temporarily store the values of the l 
un-chained flip-flops. These dummy flip-flops and those in the public partial 
chain will feed into an exclusive-or (XOR) gate to produce the SO. A linear 
feedback shift register (LFSR) is used as most of the time we have l << n, that 




Figure 16: Structure of the public-private secure partial scan chains with LFSR based 




      The n+k flip-flops in Block A and Block B, which if chained together would have 
formed a full scan chain, are connected to CUT to support the normal functionality of 
the CUT. The output signals from Block A and Block C will be XOR-ed and the result 
can be observed from the SO port.  
      To generate a test input and output pair, we push the values of the flip-flops in 
Block A through the SI port of the partial scan and provide a specific input sequence 
through the external input of the FSM in Block B to set values for the un-chained flip-
flops. Note that these two procedures are performed in parallel and can be designed 
without test input vector loading overhead (for example, in case when n>>k). After 
the CUT executes with the desired test input vector, the n+k flip-flops in Block A and 
Block C will store system state information with the k flip-flops in Block C storing a 
backup copy for flip-flops in Block B. The test output vector is generated by bit-wise 
XOR-ing the flip-flops in Block A and Block C. 
      As shown in Block B of Figure 16, the first l un-chained flip-flops are directly 
connected to extra combinational logic to form a sequential circuit that implements an 
FSM controlled by the external input signal/vector CI. In the meantime, the remaining 
(k-l) un-chained flip-flops also need to be set accordingly. To achieve this, all the k 
un-chained flip-flops are connected like a shift register (or another partial scan chain) 
as illustrated in Figure 16. Every time the first l un-chained flip-flops reach a set of 
desired values, they will be right shifted to the next l flip-flops in the chain. 
Afterwards, the first l flip-flops will switch back to the extra combinational logic 
while their contents will be reset to the reset state of the FSM. Then the FSM will 




values into the first l un-chained flip-flops. During these transitions, the other (k-l) 
un-chained flip-flops should remain unchanged. This process will be repeated until all 
the k un-chained flip-flops are correctly set to the values equal to those in the test 
input vector. The motivation of this approach is to avoid the hardware overhead in 
implementing large FSM with k flip-flops. A Counter B is implemented to control the 
timing such as when the FSM should reset.  
      In a nutshell, by adding FSM in Block B for controllability and Block C for 
observability, the unchained flip-flops in Block B can be tested just as if they are in 
the full scan design. We will elaborate the LFSR based scan output obfuscation in 
Chapter 7. 
5.4.3 Private Chain with Multiple Partial Scan Chains 
      We now present the structure of the proposed public-private partial scan design 
with multiple private scan chains, where the scan output is protected by a 
configurable PUF instead of the LFSR.  
      Figure 17 depicts the structure of this proposed public-private partial scan chains. 
The CUT will be connected to both the public scan chain on the top and the private 
scan chains at the bottom. The flip-flops in the public chain can be accessed directly 
through the regular SI and SO ports. A parallel input (PI) ports and parallel output 
(PO) ports provide the interface to the flip-flops in the private chains. The key 
challenge to achieve full testability is how to control and access the private scan 




      Compared to the single private scan chain design with an LFSR, there are several 
notable difference here. First, the SO port in the public chain provides direct output 
and it does not involved in the obfuscation of the output from the private chains. 
Second, the un-chained flip-flops form multiple chains and there are parallel output 
(PO) ports. Third, instead of the LFSR, a configurable PUF circuitry is used and the 
PUF bits are used to XOR the parallel output from the multiple private chains. 
      The generation of the input test vector with the multiple private scan chains is the 
same as that in the single private chain except that the k un-chained flip-flops in the 
FSM will serve as the start of k parallel private chains as shown in Figure 17. As a 
result, instead of shifting one bit at a time, k bits can be shifted simultaneously in this 
implementation, making it faster to have the input test vector set. 
 
 
Figure 17: Structure of the public-private secure partial scan chains with configurable 




      To validate the test output, the parallel private chains will shift out their contents 
and a comparison with the expected output would tell whether there is any fault or 
defect. Most of the existing countermeasures to observability based attacks can be 
applied to prevent the contents from leaking to the attackers. In our approach, we use 
a cost-effective secure method based on the configurable RO PUF [75]. 
5.5 Summary 
      In this chapter, we give the rationale of the proposed public-private partial scan 
chain framework that can provide full testability and security. We briefly mention 
that a hardware implemented FSM will be used to generate the input test vectors for 
the private scan chain(s). We also outline the key ideas in our approach with focus on 
how the un-chained flip-flops are connected in the private scan chain(s). Two 
implementation of the private scan chain with single and multiple partial chains are 
discussed and further details will be elaborated in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.   
      To conclude this chapter, we mention that our approach guarantees the same test 
coverage of a full scan chain because we can test all the given input test vectors. At 
the same time, the separation of public partial scan chain and private partial scan 
chain(s) provides security to the un-chained flip-flops. Finally, recall that full 
testability also includes the capability of in-field test with both manufacturer-provided 
test vectors and any new designed ones to diagnose unknown faults. The proposed 
public-private partial scan chain structure enables this capability and we will 





Chapter 6:  Controllability Challenge: Input Test Vector 
Generation 
      Recall that we have discussed three challenges for our secure public-private 
partial scan chain in section 5.3: controllability challenge, observability challenge and 
security challenge. In this chapter, we work on how to address the controllability 
challenge – how to set input test vectors to these un-chained flip flops in order to 
guarantee full test coverage. To begin with, we present our solutions by a small 
example. Then we elaborate each of the techniques that we have developed and 
conclude with experimental evaluations. 
6.1 Illustrative Example and Problem Formulation 
      Assume that Table 6 lists all the 5 test vectors designed to detect the defects in the 
circuit shown in Figure 14. Note that the second bit and the fifth bit cannot be 
accessed through the partial scan chain. We underline these bit values in Table 6. 
      In a full scan chain as we have discussed earlier, we can enter from the SI port the 
first input test vector tv1, 0000000, test the circuit and then shift out the response 
from the SO port for comparison with the expected output test vector 0110010.  
Meanwhile, the second input test vector tv2, 1011000 will be scanned into the scan 




      When flip-flops D2 and D5 are removed from the scan chain, we will not be able 
to enter the underlined bits directly to these two flip flops. The controllability 
challenge seeks ways to set the underlined values into D2 and D5. Our basic solution 
to this challenge is test vector reordering. For example, assuming that initially both 
D2 and D5 have value 0, we can start with tv1 and enter the 5-bit input vector, 00000, 
to the 5 flip-flops in the scan chain. This along with the initial values in D2 and D5 
will give us the original 7-bit input vector for tv1. After test, D2 and D5 will have 1 
and 0 as their contents. Now instead of testing the next text vector, 1011000, whose 
values at D2 and D5 do not match their current contents, we will test tv4. This is 
because the current contents of D2 and D5, 1 and 0, match the desired values for D2 
and D5 in tv4. Hence, we simply shift the input test vector 10010 through SI port and 
the circuit will be ready for test vector tv4. We can continue this process as long as 
we can find a test vector whose input values at the positions of the unchained flip-
flops match the current contents in these flip-flops.    
      Unfortunately, this solution does not solve the problem completely for two 
reasons. (1) In the above example, after applying tv4, D2 and D5 will have 01, but 
there is no untested input vector with 01 at these two positions. So which test vector 
Table 6: Test vectors for the 7-flip-flop design in Figure 14 
 
Index Input Vector Output Vector 
tv1 00 00000 01 10010 
tv2 10 11000 11 10101 
tv3 01 01101 10 01001 
tv4 11 00010 00 10111 





we are going to use next and how to ensure that D2 and D5 will have the correct 
values for the next test vector? (2) When there are multiple input vectors that match 
the current contents of D2 and D5, for example, tv4 and tv5 after testing tv1, which 
one should we choose? In this example, if we choose tv5, we can further test tv4. 
However, if we choose tv4, we won’t be able to test tv5. It appears that the selection 
of the next test vector does matter, which could make this problem more challenging. 
Fortunately, as we will prove in section 6.3, we can always find one optimal solution 
regardless which test vector we choose. 
      We now give a formal formulation of the controllability challenge and present our 
solutions in the rest of this chapter. Consider a circuit with N flip-flops and M test 
vectors, {(Xi, Yi)}i=1,2,…,M,  generated by a commercial ATPG tool to provide the 
desired testability. Denote the N-bit input test vectors by Xi = {xi1, xi2, …, xiN} and 
the N-bit output test vectors by Yi = {yi1, yi2, …, yiN}. During test with a full scan 
chain, each input test vector Xi will be shifted into the scan chain. Then the 
corresponding primary input values will be applied on the circuit and the circuit will 
run at the functional mode for one or more clock cycles. The test response, which is 
the values stored in the N flip-flips, can be read out from the SO port and will be 
compared with the expected output test vector Yi for fault detection and diagnosis. 
      In the proposed secure partial scan design, L flip-flops will be removed from the 
full scan chain for security concerns. Let P = {k1, k2, …, kL} be the set of L removed 
flip-flops. One cannot access these L flip-flops via SI or SO ports. Therefore, the 
partial scan chain will not provide any controllability and observability on these 




controllability challenge seeks to answer whether and how to deliver full testability 
through the partial scan chain: 
Secure partial scan chain with full test coverage. Consider a circuit with N flip-
flops and M test vectors, {(Xi, Yi)}i=1,2,…,M,  where Xi are the input test vectors and Yi 
are the output test vectors. L flip-flops are removed from the scan chain. Can the 
resulting partial scan chain provide the full testability and security simultaneously? 
More specifically, can one (i) apply each of the M input test vectors Xi on the circuit 
and test the responses against the corresponding output test vectors Yi, and (ii) apply 
test vectors other than {(Xi, Yi)}i=1,2,…,M for in-field test, without (iii) accessing the 
data stored in the L hidden flip-flops. 
      In the rest of this chapter, we first propose a graph representation for the portion 
of test vectors that is not in the partial scan chain (that is, the underlined bit values in 
Table 6). Then with the help of this representation, we elaborate our approaches of 
test vector reordering, reusing, and secure generation to provide full test coverage. 
6.2 Hidden-Test-Vector Graph 
      Recall that Xi = {xi1, xi2, …, xiN} is the input test vector and P = {k1, k2, …, kL} is 
the set of L removed flip-flops. Denote  
Xi|P  = {xis}   where s ∈ P 
Xi - Xi|P = {xis}  where s ∉ P 
Similarly, we can define Yi|P  and Yi - Yi|P. Thus, (Xi - Xi|P, Yi - Yi|P) is the portion of 




the bits in the input-output test vectors that are for the un-chained flip-flops, which 
we will refer to as hidden input-output test vectors. 
      We convert the M test vectors {(Xi, Yi)}i=1,2,…,M into a directed graph, which we 
call hidden-test-vector graph, described as follows: 
(1) each node, tvi, represents a test vector  (Xi, Yi) 
(2) a directed edge from node tvi and node tvj exists if and only if Yi|P = Xj|P 
      Figure 18 is the hidden-test-vector graph converted from the five test vectors 
listed in Table 6. For example, there is an edge from tv1 to tv5 because the hidden 
output vector of tv1 matches the hidden input vector of tv5. The hidden-test-vector 
graph has the following special property which plays a crucial role in our proposed 
test vector reordering approach.  
      Shared neighbor property. In the hidden-test-vector graph, if two nodes have a 
common child then they will share all their children. Similarly, if two nodes have a 
common parent node, then they will share all the parent nodes. 
[Proof] Suppose that two nodes (Xi, Yi) and (Xj, Yj) have a common child (Xk, Yk), 
we have Yi|P = Xk|P and Yj|P = Xk|P. So Yi|P = Yj|P, which means that the two test 
vectors (Xi, Yi) and (Xj, Yj) have identical hidden output vector. For any child (Xs, 
Ys) of node (Xi, Yi), Xs|P = Yi|P = Yj|P. So (Xs, Ys) must also be a child of node (Xj, 
Yj). For exactly the same reason, any child of (Xj, Yj) is also a child of (Xi, Yi). 
Therefore, nodes (Xi, Yi) and (Xj, Yj) will share all their children, that is, nodes with 





6.3 Test Vector Reorder 
      As we have seen in the illustrative example in the beginning of this chapter, if a 
test vector’s hidden input portion matches the hidden output vector of another test 
vector (e.g. tv4 and tv1), we can use the partial scan chain to test these two test 
vectors one after another. Formally, we have 
      Lemma 1. In the hidden-test-vector graph, for any directed path, all the test 
vectors corresponding to the nodes along the path can be tested via the partial scan 
chain if we can set the first node’s hidden input vector on the L hidden flip-flops. 
[Proof]. If we can set the first node’s hidden input vector on the L hidden flip-flops, 
simply entering the rest test input vector by the SI port of the partial scan chain will 
enable us to test the first test vector. After the test, according to the definition of the 
hidden-test-vector graph, the L hidden flip-flops will have the same values as the 




Figure 18: The hidden test vector graph based on the five test vectors in Table 6. “in” 




vector by entering its other input vector through the partial scan chain. This process 
can continue till we reach and test the last test vector in the path.   
      For example, in Figure 18, there is a path tv2tv3tv1tv5tv4. If we can set 
the two hidden flip-flops to be 00, which is the hidden input vector for tv2, we can 
test all the 5 test vectors without accessing the hidden flip-flops again. 
      From Lemma 1, we see that if we can find n paths to cover all the nodes in the 
hidden-test-vector graph, we only need to access the hidden flip-flops n times to test 
all the M test vectors. Because access to the hidden flip-flops is prohibited or 
expensive, we propose the following minimization problem: 
      Test vector reordering problem. Given a hidden-test-vector graph, find the 
minimal number of paths to cover all the nodes. 
      Recall that the well-studied NP-complete Hamiltonian path problem: in the 
mathematical field of graph theory, a Hamiltonian path is a path in an undirected or 
directed graph that visits each vertex exactly once [82]. If one can solve the test 
vector reordering problem and the optimal solution has only one path, that path will 
be a Hamiltonian path. If the optimal solution has more than one path, the answer to 
the Hamiltonian path problem will be “No”. This seems to suggest that we will not be 
able to solve the test vector reordering problem optimally in polynomial time. 
However, as we will show next, the hidden-test-vector graph is not a general graph. It 
has the shared neighbor property which allows us to solve the test vector reordering 




      Lemma 2. In the hidden-test-vector graph, when a node has multiple outgoing 
edges, choosing any edge can lead to an optimal solution to the test vector reordering 
algorithm. 
      [Proof] Without loss of generality, consider Figure 19(a) where node A has two 
outgoing edges to node B and node C. We first consider the case when there is no 
edge between B and C. Nodes B and C will either have A as their only common 
parent node or they have other common parent nodes. When A is the only common 
parent, it’s obvious that choosing either edge AB or edge AC gives us exactly two 
paths as the optimal solution, that is S1ABS2 and CS4 in the first case, and  
S1ACS4 and BS2 in the second case. 
      Now assume that there is a node D that is the parent of B or C. Note that because 
of the shared neighbor property, node B and node C will share node D as a parent (see 
Figure 19(b)). If we choose edge AB, assuming that an optimal solution contains 
paths S1ABS2 and S3DCS4, we now construct an optimal solution, in 
terms of the number of paths in the solution, with edge AC being chosen instead of 
edge AB. Clearly, we can build two paths S1ACS4 and S3DBS2, which 
cover all the nodes that the original two paths S1ABS2 and S3DCS4 
cover. Combined with other paths in the optimal solution when choosing edge AB, 




      A special situation that needs to be taken into account is, as shown in Figure 
19(b), when S1ABS2 and S3DCS4 (or simply S2 and S3) are connected. 
In that case, an optimal solution uses only one path S1ABS2S3DCS4 
to cover this portion of the graph. Using S1AC does not seem to be able to cover 
BS2S3D. We consider two paths S1ACS4 and S3DBS2 (a loop 
indeed) and then insert the second path/loop between the link AC. This insertion 
can be conveniently done by matching the hidden input vector of each node in the 
loop with the hidden output vector of nodes in other paths. In this example, we will 
find the hidden input vector of node B matching the hidden output vector of node A. 
So we can break the path at AC. The shared neighbor property guarantees the 
existence of edge DC because DB is part of the loop. After the insertion, we 
have exactly the same solution as before: S1ABS2S3DCS4. 
      For the case when nodes B and C are connected by an edge, we can use the same 
method to prove that from any optimal solution that chooses edge AB, a solution that 
has the same number of paths can be constructed by choosing edge AC. This 
completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
 
(a)                                                (b)    




      The proof of Lemma 2 shows an effective method to construct an optimal solution 
to the test vector reordering problem: 
      Apparently, each edge will be visited at most once in Step 1, so it takes O(|E|) 
time to build all the paths in Step 1 and Step 2. Since a loop needs to be compared 
with all the other edges of all found paths until a position is found, O(|V|) time is 
required in the worst case. Hence, for all the loops, it takes O(|V|2) to check for loop 
insertion in Step 3. Therefore the above algorithm’s complexity is O(|E| + |V|2), where 
|V| and |E| are the number of nodes and edges in the hidden-test-vector graph, 
respectively. 
6.4 Test Vector Reuse 
      The rationale behind the test vector reordering technique is to continue running 
the test vectors with the minimum number of times to set the hidden input vectors (we 
Step 1. Start with an arbitrary node (preferable one without any incoming edge) to 
build a path by choosing any outgoing edge and continue until a node with no 
outgoing edge is reached. 
Step 2. Repeat step 1 for all the nodes that are not covered by any path. 
Step 3. For all the paths built in step 2, if the path is a loop, check to see whether it can 
be inserted into another path. If the start/end node of the loop matches any edge in 
another path from step 2, then the loop can be inserted in this particular edge’s 




need to load these values at the start of each path). In order to save test time and 
power, we avoid testing the same test vector more than once. However, such cost 
could be lower than that to load values to the hidden flip-flops, which we will discuss 
in the next subsection. Therefore, if a node is on multiple paths in the hidden-test-
vector graph, reusing test vectors can connect these paths and save the efforts of 
loading the hidden flip-flops. We first show this concept by the following example. 
      Consider the six test vectors in Table 7, where only the hidden bits in the test 
vectors are shown for simplicity. After test vector reordering, three paths are 
obtained: tv_1tv_6tv_2, tv_3tv_4 and tv_5. If we can reuse tv_6, two paths 
tv_3tv_4 and tv_5 can be merged to one: tv_3tv_4tv_6tv_5, which will save 
the efforts to load the hidden flip-flops. However, this reuse process leads to test time 
overhead due to the testing of the same test vector (tv_6 in this case) twice. 
Therefore, a parameter _	
	 can be defined as follows to control the 
maximum number of test vectors we can reuse to connect two paths.  
_	
	 =  
cost of loading hidden flip flops
cost of running one test vector
 
      In this section, we propose and study the following problem: 
Table 7: Test vectors with the bits in P indicated 
tv_1: (11, 01) tv_2: (00, 11) tv_3: (10, 10) 






      Test vector reusing problem. Given a hidden test vector graph and an optimal 
solution to the test vector reordering problem, reduce the number of paths by reusing 
nodes under the _	
	 constraint. 
      Let {S1, S2, …} be an optimal solution to the test vector reordering problem. For 
each path Si, let hi be its head node and ti be its tail node. We convert the test vector 
reusing problem to the traveling salesman problem (TSP) and then use some TSP 
solver to solve the problem. 
 
6.5 Hidden Input Vector Generation by Finite State Machine 
     After test vector reordering and reusing, it is our hope that all the test vectors will 
form a long path so we can do the test without resetting the values in the hidden flip-
flops. If this fails, we have to find a way to access the hidden unchained flip-flops. 
Recall that we un-chain these flip-flops for security purpose. Hence, security has to 
be considered when we design mechanisms to access these hidden flip-flops. 
Step 1. For each node ti, perform a breadth first search in the hidden test vector 
graph till all the head nodes hj (j ≠ i) are found or maximum_steps is reached. 
Step 2. Create a weighted directed “path” graph, where each path Si is a node and 
an edge from Si to Sj indicates hj was found from ti in Step 1. The distance between 
ti and hj in the hidden test vector graph is used as the weight of edge Si  Sj. 
Step 3. Apply a solver to the traveling salesman problem (TSP) on each of the 




      In this section, we describe how we build an FSM to gain control of the un-
chained flip-flops. The basic idea is that as we traverse the FSM, whose states are 
represented by a set of flip-flops, the contents of these flip-flops will change. Once 
they change to the values that we want to set in the hidden flip-flops or a portion of 
them, we can stop traversing the FSM and copy the state of the FSM to the hidden 
flip-flops. 
      There are two requirements for the design of this FSM: (1) there should be a reset 
state to reset (not necessarily to be all 0’s) the value for each of the hidden flip-flops; 
(2) all the other 2k-1 states (except the reset state) should be reachable from the reset 
state, where k is the number of hidden flip-flops. This allows us to attain any required 
states by first resetting these flip-flops and then executing corresponding inputs to 
travel along the FSM from the reset state to the desired state. In addition, since k, the 
number of hidden flip-flops, may be large and the cost of implementing an FSM with 
large size could be high, it is also important to consider the cost of the FSM design. 
      We propose to implement an FSM with only l << k flip-flops to control the FSM 
design and implementation cost. The first l hidden flip-flops will be directly 
connected to the extra combinational logic to implement an FSM with external input 
and control signals. The details on how to implement this FSM in hardware and 
integrate it to the proposed scheme have been discussed in section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. 
Here we discuss how to build such FSM from scratch.  
      Algorithm below shows how to build an FSM such that there are at least F 
different ways from an initial state to reach all the states in the FSM with exactly M 




upper bound on the number of steps which indicates the maximum steps we would 
allow a distinct path to go through in order to reach a desired state. This will be 
determined by the timing requirement of the scan chain architecture. F is a security-
specific parameter to obfuscate the hidden input test vector’s dependency on the FSM 
input sequence. For example, if one l-bit sequence needs to be generated t times to 
feed into the k un-chained flip-flops, and we do not want to use any FSM input 
sequence more than once (otherwise, when the FSM has the same reset state, the 
same input sequence will lead to the same values of the l flip flops, which will leak 
the information that certain portions of the hidden input vector are identical.), we 
must have F>t different ways to generate this l-bit sequence. 
      We create a random 2lx2l seed matrix A in line 1, where each entry aij represents 
the number of transitions from state i to state j in the seed FSM. It is worth noting that 
the sum of all the entries in each row, which is the out-degree of each state in the 
FSM, must equal to 2s, where s is the number of input bits to the FSM. For example, 
when there are 3 bits for the FSM input, the entries aij’s should sum up to 2
3=8. The 
value of s is considered as a tunable parameter to balance the design hardware 






      Let the first row of the matrix represent the initial state (or the reset state), to 
determine how many different paths there are from the initial state to each of the state 
after m steps for the initial FSM, we can simply raise A to the power of m (line 4). 
Thus, by directly checking all the entries in the first row, we can decide whether we 
have at least F distinct paths from the reset state to all the states in m steps (line 6). 
Once such an FSM is found (line 10), we return the seed matrix A and the number of 




parameters are implemented and the associated area overhead will be evaluated and 
reported in Section 6.6. 
      Figure 20 gives an illustrative example for Algorithm 1 with l = 2 unchained flip-
flops and F = 4 different ways to reach each of the four states {S0, S1, S2, S3} from 
the initial state S = S0. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is only one 
input bit in the FSM to be built, i.e. s = 1. Figure 20(a) is the seed matrix A and the 
state transition graph of its corresponding FSM is given in Figure 20(c). For example, 
the two 1’s in the first row indicate that there is one way to go from the initial state S0 
directly to either state S1 or state S3. This can be easily verified in Figure 20(c).  
      The fourth power A4 of the seed matrix A is listed in Figure 20(b), where we can 
see that all the four entries in the first row equal to 4 (indeed, according to Algorithm 
we just covered, we need all entries to be greater than or equal to 4). This indicates 
that there are exactly four different ways to reach each of the state from the initial 
state after 4 steps. For example, from the initial state S0, on input sequence 0001, the 
FSM will go through the transition of S0S1S0S1S1 and reach state S1. 
                                   
   
(a). Seed Matrix A           (b). Matrix A4       (c). An FSM corresponds to Matrix A 




Similarly, 4-bit input sequences 0100, 0111, or 1000 will all lead the FSM to state S1. 
The security feature of this FSM will be further elaborated in the next chapter. 
      When we need more and longer paths to reach each state, we can conveniently 
compute Am for all the m-transition paths. Multiple paths to the same state can 
enhance security because an adversary will not be able to bind an input sequence 
from the FSM with the state it will reach. It further increases the difficulty for the 
adversary to break the FSM and gain control of the hidden flip flops. 
6.6 Experimental Results 
      The goal of our experimentation is to demonstrate the advantages of our approach 
compared to the traditional partial scan design and to evaluate the practical concerns 
about our approach. Information about the benchmark circuits and design tools used 
in the experiments are summarized in Table 8. 
     Comparison with the traditional partial scan design with ATPG for 
sequential circuit. For each of the benchmark circuits, we randomly remove 10% of 
the flip-flops from the full scan chain. For real secure chip design, flip-flops that are 
designated to store sensitive data should be considered first. In addition to our 
Table 8: Benchmarks and Design Tools 
Benchmark Circuits ISCAS’89 
Synthesize Tool Design Compiler 
Scan Chain Insertion DFT Compiler 
Test Pattern Generation TetraMax ATPG 
FSM Generation C++ 





approach, it is also possible to perform a normal partial scan design for sequential 
circuits. Table 9 reports the comparison among this approach, our approach, and full 
scan approach. The total number of flip-flops is shown in column 2. Column 3 
denotes the test coverage of normal partial scan after re-running ATPG, where we do 
see that an average of 0.6% faults are not covered. Column 4 gives the test time 
increase of partial scan, which on average is almost 3.0X longer than the test time of 
full scan approach. Finally, the partial scan needs sequential ATPG to generate test 
patterns, whose run time ranges from 2X to almost 3000X with an average of 627.7X 
longer than that of the full scan chain as shown in the last two columns. As a 
comparison, since our scheme applies exactly the same test vectors as the full scan 
design, we do not need to re-run ATPG and can achieve full test coverage. For test 
time, because our partial scan is 10% shorter than the full scan and the extra steps to 
control and observe the un-chained flip-flops are done in parallel during the shifting 
phase of the partial scan, test time will be reduced by about 10%. 
      Performance evaluation of the FSM. In our approach, an FSM needs to be 
implemented to provide multiple paths from the initial state to other states. Figure 21 
demonstrates the area overhead, normalized to the area of the benchmark, of the 16-
state, 32-state, and 64-state FSM, which has average of 4.41%, 4.98%, and 5.07%, 
respectively. More importantly, this area overhead of FSM won’t change dramatically 
when the number of states is fixed, which indicates that such overhead is negligible 




      Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the number of transitions, i.e. the length of the 
input sequence to the FSM, required to reach other states in a 16-state FSM with 1-
bit, 2-bit, and 3-bit input of the FSM (Figure 22), and in a 16-state/32-state/64-state 
FSM (with 2-bit control input, Figure 23), respectively. Clearly, we can see that as 
one asks for more distinct paths, increasing the number of transitions or the number 
of input bits to the FSM is more effective than increased the number of states, i.e. the 
number of flip-flops in the FSM. 
6.7 Summary 
      Directly removing sensitive flip-flops from the scan chain can completely take 
away attackers’ access to these data, which in turn provides high security of the scan 
design. In this chapter, we have discussed how to gain control of the unchained flip 
flips through two test vectors manipulation techniques and a novel FSM construction 
method. To maintain the same full test coverage for the proposed public-private 
partial scan chains, we put forward a three-step solution, including test vector 
reordering, reusing and secure generation. The first two steps are implemented at the 
test vector level which requires no changes to the hardware design. However, they 








ATPG run time (s) 
Full Partial 
s9234 145 99.6 211.2 0.4 63.4 
s5378 176 99.8 309.8 0.5 1.0 
s15850 513 99.2 609.2 2.0 1081.2 
s13207 625 98.2 345.8 1.2 3552.9 
s38584 1275 99.8 212.4 4.0 57.0 
s38417 1564 99.7 104.1 90.7 3534.8 





cannot guarantee to enable the test of all required test vector. The secure test vector 
generation deployed an FSM to provide test engineers with full controllability of the 
un-chained flip-flops, as a complement to the first two steps. In this way, no 
information from the hidden flip flips will be leaked. The experimental results show 
that the FSMs can be implemented in hardware with little overhead. Our partial scan 
chain outperforms the traditional partial scan chain in terms of test time, fault 
coverage, and run time in test vector generation.  We implement FSMs of various 
sizes and perform simulation on ISCAS’89 benchmark circuits and the results show 









Figure 21: Area overhead of the 16/32/64-state FSMs. 
 
 
Figure 22: Impact of the number of FSM control input (CI) bits. 
 




Chapter 7:  Observability Challenge: Output Test Vector 
Obfuscation 
      In addition to the controllability challenge discussed in Chapter 6, observability 
challenge and security challenge need to be addressed for the secure partial scan 
design. In this chapter, we focus on these two challenges. From the discussion in 
Chapter 6, a test engineer can control the value of the un-chained flip-flops via an 
FSM. It’s equally important for the test engineer to observe the test responses, 
including those from the un-chained flip-flops, to complete the chip testing. If the 
values of the un-chained flip-flops are directly shifted out from some output port 
similar to the SO port, attackers may also be able to observe them to obtain sensitive 
information.  
      In this regard, we propose two lightweight mechanisms, one based on linear 
feedback shift register (LFSR) and the other one based on configurable physical 
unclonable function (PUF), with which we can verify the correctness of test responses 
without leaking any information to the attackers. Both methods achieve this by 
utilizing the XOR gates to obfuscate the contents of the un-chained flip-flops first and 
then send them out for test verification. The LFSR based scan output obfuscation 
approach has been shown in Chapter 5 (Figure 16), where the unchained flip-flops are 
connected to form a single chain, thus only one output port is needed. The PUF based 
scheme (Figure 17) works with multiple private chains and requires multiple output 




methods, the test output vectors will not be the original test response directly from 
CUT, they need to be modified for test purpose. 
7.1 LFSR based Scan Out for the Un-chained Flip-flops  
      For our convenience, we redraw the proposed LFSR based scan design in Figure 
24, which is part of the structure in Figure 16. The k flip-flops D1' to Dk' are 
connected to the CUT to load test responses during capture phase. Since they don’t 
play any role in the functionality of the design, we refer to them as dummy cells. To 
read out their contents without losing data security, the bits from the partial scan 
chain in Block A and these dummy cells are XOR-ed before they can be read from the 
SO port. This gives a way to verify the test response on the k un-chained flip-flops 
without directly leaking their information. For example, if the test response from the 
n flip-flops in the public chain is 10101010 and that in the k un-chained flip-flops is 
001, the expected test output vector will be 10,101,010 ⊕ 01,001,001 = 11, 100, 011, 
where the values 001 in the k un-chained flip-flops have been repeated (implemented 
 




as an LFSR).   
      However, the XOR gate might give false results. For instance, if two bits both 
with expected value 1 are flipped to 0 simultaneously, the fault will not be detectable 
since the XOR gate’s output would be 0 in both cases. To reduce this false rate, 
dummy cells are connected in a way to create a Linear Feedback Shift Register 
(LFSR). The test response is used as the seed. The LFSR is cycling concurrently with 
the shifting phase in the partial scan chain in Block A. After n clock cycles when the 
shifting phase ends, a Counter B is deployed to clear the contents of the dummy cells 
to further prevent information leakage. This defines a deterministic way on how the 
contents in dummy cells will be altered by the LFSR. Hence, the test responses can be 
predicted, verified, and provided to the test engineer as the expected test output for 
the given test input vector. During the in-field test, a test engineer can compare the 
real response with the expected value to check if fault occurs. 
      Note that there is no guarantee of zero false (a full scan chain cannot guarantee 
this either because its scan flip-flops may be faulty too). However, with the LFSR 
running cyclically, the chance of any error in the un-chained flip-flop being 
undetected will be reduced exponentially because that requires all the corresponding 
flip-flops in the partial scan chain in Block A, those that will be XOR-ed with the 
faulty un-chained flip-flop to fault simultaneously, which is a rare event. More 
precisely, we have the following:  
Suppose that an error occurs on a flip-flop in the public partial chain in Block A 
with probability α, on a un-chained flip-flop with probability β,  and occurs when 




with probability γ, assuming that all the errors occur independently, for each test 
vector, an error remains undetected if and only if one of the following sets of 
flip-flops all have errors:    
(i) SDi, SDi+k, SDi+2k, …, and Di 
(ii) SDi, SDi+k, SDi+2k, …, and Di’ 
(iii) Di， and Di’ 
The total probability of these cases is  
p = αn/k(β(1-γ)+(1-β)γ)+(1-α)n/kβγ  
which is  
αn/k(β+γ-2βγ)+(1-α)n/kβγ  
and can be approximate as 
≈ αn/kβ ≈ αn/k 
where the first approximation comes from the fact that γ, the probability of error 
when copy from one flip-flop to another with a short wire connection, is 
extremely low (that is γ<<α, β); and the second approximation comes from the 
fact that a computation error occurs at any flip-flop is equally likely, i.e. α=β.  
      Therefore, an error during test remains unnoticed through the scan structure in 
Fig. 24 will be extremely low. Furthermore, we see that the use of LFSR plays a 
major role in this low probability. It reduces the error probability exponentially from 




7.2 Configurable PUF based Output Obfuscation 
      Another scheme to prevent information leakage from the private chains, is to 
XOR each bit from the private chain with a random secret bit stream as shown in 
Figure 17. The random bit stream is recommended to be generated by the hardware to 
ensure its security. We adopt the highly flexible ring oscillator PUF proposed in [75]. 
      A ring oscillator (RO) consists of odd number of inverters. Figure 25 depicts the 
architecture that gives us the flexibility to select inverters for the construction of ROs. 
A multiplexer will be added after each inverter to control whether the inverter will be 
included in the RO. This is achieved by the selection bit of the multiplexer. If the 
selection bit is “1”, the corresponding inverter will be included in the RO; if the 
selection bit is “0”, the inverter will not be used and the signal will go through the 
wire to the next inverter (so the corresponding inverter will not be used in the RO). 
 
      When the same set of selection bits are given to two such flexible ROs, the delay 
of the two “identical” ROs they have constructed will be different by normally a very 
small margin because of fabrication variation. A PUF bit can be created based on 
 
 





such difference. As shown in Figure 17, a vector of such PUF bits is used to XOR 
each bit from the last flip-flop in the private chains to produce the parallel output PO. 
      We now describe how the test vectors can be built and provided to the test 
engineers. A sequence of input values can be provided at the PI port to run the FSM 
and create the desired input test vector at the flip-flops on the private chains. Then the 
CUT will be set to the state for test. After test, the flip-flops, including the un-chained 
private ones, will contain data value that needs to be verified. When these values 
reach the last flip-flop in each parallel scan chain, they will be used as the selection 
bit to build two flexible ROs whose delay will be compared to generate a PUF bit. A 
vector of such random PUF bits will be generated at the same time. We XOR these 
PUF bits and the flip-flop’s contents and shift them out as the output test vector. One 
advantage of PUF based approach is that the PUF bits will be different from chip to 
chip, making the test output vectors also distinct for each chip. More about the 
security of this approach will be analyzed in section 7.4. 
      There are many hardware design issues to be considered when we implement this 
approach. One of the most important challenges is timing. Because that the contents 
of the flip-flops in the parallel private chains need to be XOR-ed with the PUF bits, 
and these contents are also used as the selection bits for the flexible RO PUF, we 
need to allow sufficient delay for the PUF bits to be generated before collected the 
test output vector from the PO ports.  Another important feature is the robustness of 
the PUF bits as it is well-known that RO PUF can be sensitive to operating 
environment variations such as temperature, operating voltage, humidity, and circuit 




this dissertation. Interested readers can read some of the survey work on PUF such as 
[83]. 
7.3 Protocol for In-Field Test 
      The test vectors provided to the test engineers can be pre-computed as 
aforementioned and released to the user together with the chip. However, another 
important feature for the full testability is whether arbitrary input test vectors can be 
applied to the circuit for test and whether the test response can be verified to detect 
chip defects, in particular after the chip is deployed which is known as in-field test. 
The true challenge of in-field test lies in that it may require new test input vectors, 
test them on the circuit, and verify whether the test response is as desired. This can be 
easily achieved when full scan chain is provided and the user can obtain the desired 
test responses from the system specification or other means. But for our proposed 
public-private secure scan design, users cannot access the private portion of the scan 
chain and thus dedicated methods need to be implemented to provide such in-field 
test capability. 
      Due to the nature that the circuit itself cannot distinguish attackers from test 
engineers (user authentication could fail), we believe that such in-field test feature has 
to be accomplished by on-demand protocols such as the one we will describe below 
in this section. 
      Suppose that the user wants to test input vector V, the circuit provider or the 
service team will create the test input vector Vpub, which is identical to the portion of 




generate the portion of V that belongs to the private chains. The desired response R 
will also consist of two parts: Rpub and Rpri. Rpub is identical to those in R, while Rpri 
will be generated following the methods such as those in sections 7.1 and 7.2 with the 
help of the LFSR and PUF, respectively. In the LFSR-based solution, the test 
response depends on the seed and the LFSR configuration. In the PUF-based solution, 
after the circuit is fabricated, the delay information for the inverters on the RO PUFs 
can be collected and an off-chip emulator can be built to predict the PUF bits. The 
quadruple (Vpub, Vpri, Rpub, Rpri) is then sent to the field for test as the test vector. 
Once the user receives this quadruple, the in-field test can be conducted as follows: 
Vpub will be fed through SI port, Vpri will enter the circuit through the CI/PI port; then 
after the test, Rpub and Rpri can be observed directly from the SO and/or PO ports 
respectively. If any bit of the observed output does not match Rpub and Rpri as 
expected, fault or defect is detected. The user can contact the circuit provider or the 
service team for further diagnosis. 
7.4 Security Analysis 
      Scan based side-channel attacks have been classified into two categories, 
observability attacks and controllability attacks. In this section, we analyze the 
efficiency of our approach against these two types of attacks as well as potential 
attacks specifically targeting our proposed public-private secure partial scan chain. 
      Assumption on the attackers. Similar to attacking models used in existing 
literatures, we assume that the attacker 1) is unable to de-package the chip and probe 
internal signals; but 2) has access to the control pins related to test, such as SI/SO/SE 




interface and observe the corresponding test output (and match with the expected 
output). 
      Observability based attacks. In the scan-based observability attacks, the attacker 
first applies a stimulus at the primary inputs, then runs the circuit in functional mode 
and takes snapshots of the circuit’s state at any point by shifting out data via SO port. 
By analyzing the observed results, the attacker may retrieve useful information. Our 
partial scan based approach prevents this type of attacks by removing certain flip-
flops from the scan chain thus their contents will not be available directly through the 
SO port. Potential attacks to the obfuscated test output are discussed below in the 
session of “specific attacks targeting the proposed partial scan”. 
      Controllability based attacks. In this popular scan-based attack, the attacker 
uses the SI port to load specific vectors into the system to control internal states and 
observes the output responses. To launch this attack on our proposed public private 
secure scan design, the attacker needs to be able to control the un-chained flip-flops. 
In our approach, the attacker can inject input sequence from the FSM control input, 
but he does not know the transitions of the FSM and cannot push specific values to 
the un-chained flip-flops. Thus any controllability attack will become ineffective. 
This will be elaborated more next. 
      Specific attacks targeting the proposed partial scan. As shown above, our 
approach can mitigate both types of existing scan side channel attacks. But this relies 
on the assumption that the contents in the un-chained flip-flops cannot be controlled 




Replay attack. First, the attacker may analyze the FSM control signal sequences to 
guess the state of the FSM and gain controllability to the un-chained flip-flops. More 
specifically, if the same FSM control signal sequence is used multiple times, it is 
ensured that the same state in the FSM will be reached. Thus the attacker may be able 
to reason and figure out the physical meaning the FSM state and gain more inside 
information about the FSM and consequently the un-chained private chain. Then, the 
attacker can use this control signal sequence when the corresponding FSM state is 
needed to launch any attack. More dangerously, when sufficient number of FSM 
control signal sequences is replayed and analyzed, it becomes possible for the 
attacker to reconstruct the functionality of the FSM and hence gain the entire 
controllability of the private chain. 
      We have considered this attack in the design of our approach. Remember that in 
the Algorithm discussed in Section 6.5, we have required that from the reset state of 
the FSM, there should be sufficient number of paths to reach each state so we will not 
use the same path to reach the same state more than once. In addition, all states of the 
FSM can be reached in the same number of transitions or all the FSM control signal 
sequences will have the same length. This not only simplifies the design of the FSM, 
but also prevents any information leak as the attacker will not be able to filter out any 
unreachable states or classify the FSM states based on the length of the control signal 
sequence. Moreover, contents of the un-chained flip-flops cannot be observed 





Differential analysis attack. Second, the attacker may try various means to gain 
observability of the un-chained flip-flops.  One appealing way is to inject known data 
to the partial scan chain repeatedly and use the same or similar primary input to 
launch differential analysis attacks. By fixing the values on the partial scan chain and 
the primary input, this approach does make the primary output values and the SO 
output values dependent only on the contents of the un-chained flip-flops. It definitely 
becomes possible to detect whether the un-chained flip-flops contain the same data or 
not. However, such detection will never be deterministic in the following sense. If the 
un-chained flip-flops have the same data, that is, the FSM states are the same, then 
the test responses are guaranteed to be the same. But the opposite is not true. When 
the attacker observe the same test output vector, it may not be the case that the test 
responses are the same (due to the output obfuscation procedure) and more 
importantly, different starting FSM states can produce the same ending states (which 
will be part of the test responses and stored in the hidden flip-flops in the private 
portion of the scan) with different FSM control signal sequences. Such false positive 
could mislead the attacker. Nevertheless, how much damage this differential analysis 
attack, and machine learning based attacks to be more general, may cause, for 
example, to which extent it can infer the values in the un-chained flip-flops, is still 
under further investigation. 
In-field test vulnerability. Finally, it is important to mention that removing those un-
chained hidden flip-flops from the scan chain does help to enhance data security. But 
from the point of view of test, it reduces the testability, in particular in the case when 




purpose of reducing test time has provided guidance on which flip-flops can be 
removed to minimize the loss of testability and how to generate sequential test 
vectors to provide probabilistic guarantees on the correctness of the test. In-field test 
could be a challenge. 
      On the other hand, the proposed approach can support in-field test with new test 
vectors conveniently with the interaction between chip user (or in-field testing 
engineer) and the chip builder (or customer service team). To do this, one needs to 
submit the complete input test vector to the system designer (or the service team). 
The designer can then use the FSM implementation information in the Algorithm 
described in Section 6.5 to find an FSM control signal sequence to load the desired 
values to the hidden flip-flops. Meanwhile, the corresponding test response can be 
obtained based on the system specification and the obfuscated test output should be 
computed and provided to the chip user for in-field testing purpose. 
      This has potential vulnerabilities because an attack can request the target FSM 
state or some states from which he knows how to reach the target state as the 
condition for in-field test. When this is the case: the designer will provide the 
information that the attacker needs to launch the attack. At least it may reveal the 
information on which flip-flops are hidden and how to set them to be specific values. 
However, because this in-field test capability requires the direct interaction between 
the in-field tester and the circuit designer (or service team), several mechanisms such 
as user authentication, pay per use, and device bounding can be adopted to limit the 
damage it could cause. This is out of the scope of this dissertation and we will not 




7.5 Performance Analysis 
      The common performance metrics for scan design include test coverage, test time, 
test power, hardware overhead due to the insertion of scan chain, and in-field test. In 
the previous sections we have explained that our proposed public-private secure 
partial scan chain can guarantee both full test coverage and in-field test. We will 
discuss the rest of the performance metrics next. 
      Hardware overhead. In addition to the hardware overhead of the traditional scan 
chain (e.g. the change of D flip-flops to scan cells, various control signals and logic, 
as well as routing), our proposed scan design requires a hardware implemented FSM 
and the hardware for test output obfuscation. These extra hardware will incur 
overhead in terms of chip area and power consumption. Since the power consumption 
is highly correlated to the size of the circuit (including the flip-flops) and its 
switching activity, we expect the power overhead will not be an issue during the 
chip’s normal operation and, we will focus on the area overhead only.  
     Remember that in the design of the private partial scan chains, the size of the FSM 
remains the same as the number of the chains, not the number of the flip-flops. When 
the circuit is large, we can increase the length of the private chains without changing 
the FSM design and implementation. Therefore the area overhead from the hardware 
implemented FSM will be fixed and can be considered as negligible for large systems 
in real life. However, a larger FSM or an increased number of paths to each FSM 




      For the test response obfuscation circuitry, in the LFSR based approach, area 
overhead comes from the dummy flip-flops, the counter and other logic that are 
needed to implement the LFSR. This does scale with the number of the dummy flip-
flops. In the PUF based method, the area overhead comes from the PUF design. For 
the highly flexible RO PUF we used in this dissertation, the area cost is related to the 
number of parallel private chains. 
      Test time and test power. There is no need to generate any new test vectors to 
achieve full test coverage in our approach. So the test time will be determined by the 
time to shift in the input test vectors and shift out the output test vectors, that is, the 
length of the scan chain. One of the key motivations and advantages of the traditional 
partial scan chain design is its efficiency in test time and test power because of the 
shorter chain(s). Our approach is indeed a special case of the traditional partial scan 
chains. Therefore, it inherits these advantages and will take less time than a full scan 
chain to test the same set of test vectors. The test power is determined by the 
simultaneous switches in the flip-flops. In both our design and a traditional full scan 
design, all the flip-flops may switch at the same time depending on its current content 
and its current input value. So the parallel private chains will not incur any definite 
power overhead. On the contrary, this parallel structure gives us the opportunity to 
optimize test power. 
7.6 Summary 
      In this chapter, we focus on the observability challenge of the proposed public-
private partial scan chain design architecture. We illustrate the basic idea of achieving 




implemented FSM and test outputs are obfuscated by an LFSR or PUF. We 
demonstrate that our approach not only achieves full test coverage, it also reduces test 




Chapter 8:  Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
Scan Chain is an industrial standard embedded in hardware design to facilitate 
chip testing and fault diagnosis. In this dissertation, we study two important security 
problems related to scan chain: how to utilize scan chain for hardware intellectual 
property (IP) protection and how to mitigate the increasing scan chain side channel 
attacks.  
      First, we take advantage of the availability of both Q and Q’ ports on the flip-
flops to design practical IP protection methods. We demonstrate the generation of 
digital fingerprints by selecting different connection styles between adjacent scan 
cells during the design of scan chain. This method is perhaps the most practical 
known fingerprinting scheme because fingerprints are created as a post-silicon 
procedure which will incur little fabrication overhead and test vectors are modified 
based on the different connection styles which provides a convenient non-intrusive 
fingerprint detection and verification method. As another example, we show how to 
build chip identification based on the reconfigurable scan network, an IEEE 
embedded devices design and test standard. We perform experiments on standard 
benchmarks to show that our approach has low design overhead. We also conduct 
security analysis to show that such fingerprints are robust against various attacks. 
Second, we argue that the current countermeasures to scan chain side channel 
attacks are restricted by the requirement of providing a full scan chain with direct SI 
and SO ports for testing purpose and thus conceptually they will all suffer the 




SI and SO ports as well. Therefore, we propose a novel public-private partial scan 
chain based approach with the basic idea of removing the flip- flops that store 
sensitive information from the scan chain. This will eliminate the scan chain side 
channel, but it also limits chip testing. The key innovation in this dissertation is that 
we provide a complete solution to achieve full test coverage, including in-field test 
capability, and security through partial scan chains. We analyze our approach and 
show that the required hardware has negligible area overhead and gives full test 
coverage with reduced test time and does not need to re-generate test vectors. The 
proposed public-private partial scan chain can successfully defeat all the known scan 
chain side channel attacks and potential attacks specifically designed to target our 
scan architecture. 
Through the example of scan chain, this dissertation demonstrates that 
conventional design facilities could be reused for security purposes. As attackers 
continue to exploit hardware design vulnerabilities, the work in this dissertation 
shows that specific hardware features combined with cryptographic solutions is a 
promising direction to secure system design.  
 
8.2 Future Work  
We briefly mention three lines of future research directions: new scan chain 
enabled IP protection applications, design concerns and prototyping of the public-
private partial scan chains, and more generic hardware security.  
IP protection. We describe a practical IP fingerprinting methods using the Q 




based on the same idea. We believe that other scan design features such as partial 
scan chains, reconfigurable scan chains, and the generation of test vectors can all be 
leveraged for hardware design IP protection. Moreover, the reconfigurability of the 
RSN as well as the in-field test capability could be used to build chip authentication 
protocols.   
Secure scan design. We give the rationale of behind the public-private partial 
scan chain and elaborate some design details. As the first work on this novel concept, 
there are a lot of follow-up research and development directions. (1) Due to the 
limited resource available to us, we are unable to perform any system prototype or 
simulation to evaluate the test time, test power, and other performance metrics. This 
will be mainly an engineer effort that might be very time-consuming, but it is 
absolutely necessary for the adaption of the proposed secure scan design 
methodology by industry. (2) Our approach starts with the distinction of flip-flops in 
the public partial chain and those hidden ones in the private partial chain(s) with the 
assumption that design is completed. This can create layout and routing problem 
because the flip-flops belong to the same partial scan chain might be physically apart 
to meet the functional design requirement. It will be important to consider functional 
and security requirements simultaneously to optimize the design. One interesting 
problem to ask is how many and which flip-flops should not be included in the public 
scan chain. (3) Another assumption in our problem formulation is that we assume that 
the order of the test vectors can be changed arbitrarily. This may not be true for delay 
fault detection and diagnosis where a specific set of test vectors have to be applied in 




cannot be used directly and most likely new methods have to be developed. (4) We 
have discussed some potential attacks to the proposed public-private partial scan, like 
other security problems, it will be interesting to study how to break this secure scan 
design and what countermeasures can be used to defeat these new attacks. (5) There 
are many hardware design issues to be considered when we implement the test output 
obfuscation methods. One of the most important challenges is timing. For example in 
the PUF based approach, because that the contents of the flip-flops in the parallel 
private chains need to be XOR-ed with the PUF bits, and these contents are also used 
as the selection bits for the flexible RO PUF, we need to allow sufficient delay for the 
PUF bits to be generated before collected the test output vector from the PO ports. (6) 
Finally, we believe that more attention should be paid to in-field test. Sophisticated 
attackers could request specific in-field test cases to collect data and then use learning 
based attacks to infer the functionality of the FSM that generate the contents of the 
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